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“Safe assets” is a catch-all term to describe financial contracts that
market participants treat as if they were risk-free. These may include
government debt, bank deposits, and asset-backed securities, among others.
The International Monetary Fund estimated potential safe assets at more than
$114 trillion worldwide in 2011, more than seven times the U.S. economic
output that year.
To treat any contract as if it were risk-free seems delusional after
apparently super-safe public and private debt markets collapsed overnight.
Nonetheless, safe asset supply and demand have been invoked to explain
shadow banking, financial crises, and prolonged economic stagnation. The
economic literature speaks of safe assets in terms of poorly understood natural
forces or essential particles newly discovered in a super-collider. Law is
virtually absent in this account.
Our Article makes four contributions that help to establish law’s place in
the safe asset debate and connect the debate to post-crisis law scholarship.
First, we describe the legal architecture of safe assets. Existing theories do not
explain where safe assets get their safety. Understanding this is an essential
first step to designing a regulatory response to the risks they entail. Second, we
offer a unified analytical framework that links the safe asset debate with postcrisis legal critiques of money, banking, structured finance and bankruptcy.
Third, we highlight sources of instability and distortion in the legal
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architecture, and the political commitments embedded in it. Fourth, we offer
preliminary prescriptions to correct some of these failings.
Precisely because there are no risk-free contracts, state intervention
supplies the essential infrastructure to let people act as if some contracts were
risk-free. The law constructs and maintains safe asset fictions, and it places
them at the foundation of institutions and markets. This project is unavoidably
distributive and fraught with distortions.
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Inside Safe Assets
Introduction
Multi-trillion dollar global markets depend on participants’ ability to treat
entire categories of financial contracts as if they were risk-free. “Safe assets” is
a catch-all term to describe such contracts, which have at various times
included government debt, bank deposits, AAA-rated corporate debt and assetbacked securities, commercial paper (short-term tradable debt), and overnight
repurchase agreements (“repos”), among others. Some of these assets collapsed
in value overnight during the global financial crisis that began in 2007, and
soon after, during the euro area crisis.1 Panic selling, firm failures, and public
rescues accompanied both episodes. The Federal Reserve became the largest
holder of U.S. commercial paper;2 the European Central Bank stepped in to buy
government bonds.3
These crises confirmed the obvious: there is no such thing as a risk-free
financial contract. They also raised the academic and policy profile of safe
assets. Since 2007, the idea of safe assets has been invoked to explain shadow
banking, financial crises, and prolonged economic stagnation.4 In a landmark
report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the aggregate value of
safe assets at more than $114 trillion worldwide in 2011.5 By comparison, the
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1.
For instance, the value of top-rated commercial paper issued by U.S. firms stood at $1.97
trillion in early 2007. It was a staple investment for money market mutual funds and other superconservative savers. By October 2008, this market had shrunk by more than a quarter, as buyers
demanded theretofore unfathomable risk premia. See Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, Do Global
Banks Spread Global Imbalances? Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of
2007-09,
58
REV.
37,
39
(2010),
http://www.palgraveIMF
ECON.
journals.com/imfer/journal/v58/n1/pdf/imfer20104a.pdf (documenting borrowers’ inability to roll over
maturing debts, as well as a sharp spike in borrowing costs); Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl,
When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 24 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 29, 29-30 (2010) (reporting a drop in outstanding commercial paper volume from more
than $1.97 trillion at the start of 2007 to $1.43 trillion in October 2008). Euro-area government debt, a
$10 trillion market, traded as if default were inconceivable in April 2010. Less than one-third of this
market still traded that way in February 2012, when Greece launched its bond restructuring. INT’L
MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: THE QUEST FOR LASTING STABILITY 18
(2012) [hereinafter IMF GFSR] (citing average sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads under 150
basis points for 91% of selected Euro area government debt as of April 2010 and for only 29% of the
same set as of November 2011 and February 2012; also citing average CDS spreads over 400 basis
points for 42% of the same set of countries as of November 2011). The countries included in the set are
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain; they represent the bulk of the Euro area sovereign debt market (€6.2 trillion or over $8 trillion in
the first quarter of 2010 and €6.9 trillion or over $9 trillion in the second quarter of 2011). Id; see also
id. at 90 fig.3.6 (citing Euro area gross consolidated government debt at $10.5 trillion in June 2011);
UBS Center, Jean-Claude Trichet: “There Is No More Risk-Free Asset,” YOUTUBE (Dec. 18, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CS9EvBZ_UOc.
2.
Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 1, at 2 (reporting that the U.S. Federal Reserve was the
largest buyer of commercial paper in late 2008 and held over 20% of all outstanding commercial paper
in January 2009).
3.
See IMF GFSR, supra note 1, 17-19.
4.
See sources cited supra note 1.
5.
IMF GFSR, supra note 1, at 89. The $114 trillion estimate is the sum of $74.4 trillion in
potential safe assets held by wholesale investors in June 2011, id. at 89 fig.3.4, and $40 trillion in
customer bank deposits at the end of 2010, id. at 89 n.16. IMF staff analysis excludes deposits because
(i) they reflect primarily household and nonfinancial firm holdings and (ii) present distinct financial
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total U.S. economic output for 2011 was $15.5 trillion. The term “safe assets”
was mentioned in eight speeches by U.S. Federal Reserve (“Fed”) officials
between April 30, 1998 and the end of 2007. From 2008 through August 2016,
Fed officials referred to safe assets in seventeen speeches and, on three
occasions, in Congressional testimony; some dealt with the subject at length.6
One such speech in July of 2016 highlighted risks to financial stability from
some safe assets, alongside concerns about persistent market demand
outstripping the limited supply of “genuinely safe assets.”7
The economic literature on safe assets has focused on imbalances in safe
asset supply and demand and their implications for financial stability and
growth.8 It speaks of safe assets in terms of poorly understood natural forces or
essential particles newly detected in a super-collider.9 Law is mostly absent in
this account, except as an occasional source of distortion.10
Unlike the Higgs boson, safe assets are not to be found in nature. They
exist in economic theory and in market vernacular. “Safe” in this context does
not and cannot mean genuinely risk-free, but rather “safe enough” to ignore the
risks for some purposes. We depart from the literature to ask what institutional
design elements might make a financial contract safe enough, and what—or
who—makes it possible for market participants to ignore the risks, and on what
conditions. From this perspective, safe assets look a lot like legal fictions, a
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stability concerns. Id. We add back deposits because claims on banks figure prominently in other
leading treatments of safe assets. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, RETHINKING MACRO POLICY III:
SESSION 6: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=4179179480001; Gary Gorton et al., The SafeAsset Share, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 101 (2012). For U.S. economic output, see GDP (Current US$),
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).
6.
Board
of
Governors
of
the
Federal
Reserve
System, http://search.newyorkfed.org/board_public/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2016) (Select
“Speeches/Testimony” from the drop-down menu, then search for “safe assets”).
7.
Daniel K. Tarullo, Opening Remarks at the Center for American Progress and Americans
for
Financial
Reform
Conference
(July
12,
2016),
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20160712a.htm.
8.
See infra Part I.
9.
See, e.g., Ricardo J. Caballero, The “Other” Imbalance and the Financial Crisis (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15636, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15636
(“[T]he surge of safe assets demand is a key factor behind the rise in leverage and macroeconomic risk
concentration in financial institutions in the U.S. (as well as the U.K., Germany, and a few other
developed economies), as these institutions sought the profits generated from bridging the gap between
this rise in demand and the expansion of its natural supply.”); Gorton et al., supra note 5, at 101 (“Given
the rapid amount of change within the economy over the past 60 years, the relatively constant demand
for safe debt suggests an underlying transactions technology that is not well understood.”).
10.
For example, stricter regulation requires banks and clearing houses to hold more
traditional safe assets, such as government debt. Some writers predicted that this would lead other
market participants to buy riskier assets, use them as if they were safe, and thereby seed the next crisis.
See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 82nd Annual Report (2012); IMF GFSR, supra note 1; Gorton et
al., supra note 5; Ralph Atkins, Crunch Feared if Collateral Rules Enforced, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e7737740-6f85-11e2-b906-00144feab49a.html.

38137 yar_33-2 Sheet No. 30 Side A

11/18/2016 10:27:53

04 GELPERN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/16 10:36 PM

Inside Safe Assets
familiar device that inserts an assumption known to be false in a chain of
reasoning, so as to solve a particular doctrinal problem.11
Precisely because there are no risk-free contracts, the law can conjure and
maintain safe asset fictions, and place them at the foundation of institutions and
markets. It therefore makes no sense to ask whether mortgage-backed
securities, bank deposits or Italian government debt are “entirely risk-free.”12
Their safety, such as it is, ultimately rests on state capacity to regulate, collect
taxes, and issue money, and state willingness to deploy these powers in specific
ways for the sake of particular constituents and markets. Instead of asking
whether a contract is risk-free, it pays to ask what purpose and whose interests
might be served by a societal commitment to act “as if,” and to consider the
cost of such a commitment. Whether anyone who acts “as if” believes in the
inherent safety of safe assets, or chooses to ignore risks believing that she
would be made whole, is also a second-order concern. State intervention can
justify her actions either way.13 Safe assets thus emerge from a mix of public
and private ordering, unavoidably distributive and fraught with distortions.14
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11.
See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967) (“A fiction is either (1) a statement
propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as
having utility.”). Safe assets can work as conventional legal fictions, for example, when it comes to the
legislative, regulatory, or judicial designation of certain financial contracts as risk-free. See infra Part
II.B. However, we hesitate to sweep the entire safe asset phenomenon under the heading of legal fictions
because the role of market practice in the life of safe assets goes beyond the familiar realm of legal
fictions and requires further elaboration beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. ANNELISE RILES,
COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 172-175 (2011)
(describing collateral as a legal fiction in derivatives transactions). Nonetheless, Fuller’s definition is a
useful shorthand for now, not only because it is the most thoroughly specified and influential in the law
literature, but also because his analytical framework partly derives from general concepts of fiction in
math, science, philosophy, economics and other fields. As fictions, safe assets combine known falsehood
and practical utility. Like the more familiar fictions of corporate personality or tax residence, they meet
functional needs. On corporate personality, see, for example, Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a
Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563 (1987). On tax residence, see, for
example, Vincent Boland, Dublin Ditches Double Irish to Save Low Tax Regime, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 14,
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/1f740b46-539b-11e4-929b-00144feab7de.html (describing tax
planning structures that made the same company resident in Bermuda under Irish law, and in Ireland
under U.S. law); cf. Danièle Nouy, Is Sovereign Risk Properly Addressed by Financial Regulation?, 16
BANQUE DE FRANCE FIN. STABILITY REV. 95, 96 (2012) (“From a prudential perspective, sovereign
domestic local currency debt is . . . viewed as risk-free . . . .”).
12.
EUROPEAN SYSTEMIC RISK BD., REPORT ON THE REGULATORY TREATMENT OF
SOVEREIGN
EXPOSURES
151
(2015),
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/esrbreportregulatorytreatmentsovereignexposures032015.en.pd
f [hereinafter ESRB, SOVEREIGN REPORT] (“In principle, sovereign debt is not entirely risk-free.”).
Italian debt might be treated as if it were risk free for bank regulatory purposes in the same way as
Twitter might be treated as an Irish company for tax purposes. Robert W. Wood, Ireland Corks Double
Irish Tax Deal, Closing Time for Apple, Google, Twitter, Facebook, FORBES (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:37 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/10/14/ireland-corks-double-irish-tax-deal-closing-time
-for-apple-google-twitter-facebook. Asking whether Italian government debt is really risk-free is akin to
asking whether Twitter is really Irish. Both questions are beside the point. Compare, Tarullo, supra note
7.
13.
Our view of safe assets is close to what Brunnermeier and Haddad have described in a
recent presentation as the “Safe Asset Tautology” view, in which “an asset is safe as long as it is
perceived to be safe.” Markus Brunnermeier & Valentin Haddad, Safe Assets, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y. 2 (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
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This Article makes four contributions. First, we describe the legal
architecture of safe assets, or where safe assets get their safety—an institutional
question on which the economic literature is silent. Second, we offer a unified
analytical framework that links the safe asset debate with post-crisis legal
critiques of money, banking, structured finance and bankruptcy.15 Third, we
highlight sources of instability and distortion in the legal architecture, and the
political commitments it entails. Fourth, we offer preliminary prescriptions to
correct some of these failings.
Our analysis fits in the realm of macroprudential policy, an approach to
regulation concerned with the stability of financial systems and economic
growth, ahead of the solvency of individual firms.16 This approach has gained
currency since the turn of the twenty-first century, but has only started to
receive attention from law scholars since the financial crisis. Its toolkit remains
inchoate, especially when it comes to regulating asset markets—or “prudential
market regulation.”17 Our study of safe assets shows how familiar legal and
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medialibrary/media/aboutthefed/pdf/FAR_Oct2014.pdf (contrasting the “Safe Asset Tautology” with the
“Good Friend Analogy,” in which safe assets are “safe across any horizon,” including in crisis). In our
view, while some assets might pay off in full in more states of the world, all require a leap of faith to be
used as if they were risk-free. While we concur with the authors’ assessment of bubble and bust risks
inherent in the safe asset tautology, we are hard-pressed to find safe assets outside the tautology.
14.
Compare Robert Hockett & Saule Omarova, Finance Franchise, CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (describing a modern financial system as a public franchise);
Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. OF COMP. ECON. 315 (2013) (arguing that financial
markets “occupy a hybrid place … between public and private”); MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY
PROBLEM (2016) (advocating public-private collaboration in monetary design).
15.
On asset-backed securities, see, for example, Kenneth Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed
Securities: Costs and Benefits of “Bankruptcy Remoteness,” 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1299 (2011) and
Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229 (2012). On repos, see, for
example, Edward R. Morrison et al., Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors, 69 BUS. LAW 1015 (2014),
which argues for removal of the exemption for repos from standard bankruptcy rules; and David A.
Skeel & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 152 (2012), which analyzes the same sets of exemptions for repos and derivatives. On money
market mutual funds, see, for example, William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds,
2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155; Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in
Money Market Fund Reform, 93 N.C. L. REV. 935 (2015); and Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher M.
Gandia, Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix the Problem?, 2014 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 313.
16.
For an overview of early contributions, see Piet Clement, The Term “Macroprudential”:
Origins and Evolution, BIS Q. REV. 59 (Mar. 2010). For legal approaches, see, e.g., ERIK F. GERDING,
LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 312-13 (2014); Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential
Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial
Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015); Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A
Sustainable Approach to Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881; Robert B. Thompson,
Financial Regulation’s Architecture within International Economic Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 807
(2014).
17.
The focus of macroprudential regulation has been on banks and bank-like financial firms,
for example, as in the identification and oversight of Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(SIFIs). See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, A Proposal for the Resolution of Systemically
Important Assets and Liabilities: The Case of the Repo Market, 9 INT’L J. OF CENTRAL BANKING 291
(2013). On the struggle for an approach to regulating markets for financial stability, see, e.g., Daniel K.
Tarullo, Thinking Critically about Nonbank Financial Intermediation, Remarks at the Brookings
Institution (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20151117a.htm
(arguing for “prudential market regulation” as “a policy framework that builds on the traditional
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investor-protection and market-functioning aims of market regulation by incorporating a system-wide
financial stability perspective.”). See also, Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Fin. Stability, Bank of
Eng., Speech at the International Council of Securities Associations (May 23, 2011),
http://www.bis.org/review/r110525a.pdf (“In a debate often dominated by concerns about banks, the
vital importance of resilient and effective capital markets is easily neglected.”); Buttonwood’s Notebook:
What’s
Wrong
with
Finance,
ECONOMIST
(May
1,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2015/05/finance-and-economics.
18.
Research staff at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York were at the forefront of defining
the phenomenon, although its precise contours remain subject to debate. See, e.g., Zoltan Pozsar et al.,
Shadow Banking (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Rep. No. 458, 2010) (describing how unregulated or
lightly regulated segments of the capital markets transform illiquid long-term assets into short-term
liabilities that can approximate the function of demand deposits at commercial banks); Zoltan Pozsar,
Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S Banking System, 22 FIN. MKT. INST. &
INSTRUMENTS 283 (2013) (emphasizing the importance of liquid long-term debt as a savings vehicle for
“institutional cash pools”); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking: Inaugural
Address for the Inaugural Symposium of the Review of Banking & Financial Law, 31 REV. BANKING &
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regulatory tools have been used to macroprudential effect, and how they might
be used better to advance financial stability.
We proceed as follows. In Part I, we review the definitions and theories of
safe assets, and discuss the relationship between safe assets and money. In Part
II, we turn to legal architecture, and propose a three-part framework to analyze
legal intervention to construct safe assets:
First, legal intervention can make assets safer. Contracts, statutes,
regulations, and administrative agency practices promote full and timely
repayment of some financial contracts. Corporate finance techniques and
solvency and liquidity regulations construct firms capable of issuing low-risk
debt. In all these cases, “making” is about risk reduction — a relative
proposition.
Second, the law can label assets as absolutely or relatively safe,
encouraging market participants to buy them. Regulation marks entire
categories of assets as permitted or off-limits. It also affixes regulatory price
tags to the assets and liabilities of regulated firms. Credit ratings do similar
risk-assessment and gate-keeping work in private ordering.
Third, the law enables guarantees of safe assets, so that they pay out in
multiple states of the world, even in the face of severe shocks. Some
government guarantees, such as bank deposit insurance, are expressly
authorized ex ante by statute. Most are extended ex post, in crisis, to make up
for the latent risk in assets that had been used as if they were risk-free.
Making, labeling, and guaranteeing are analytical categories that help to
clarify the object and method of legal intervention. Unpacking the elements of
safe asset design is particularly important since, in practice, different kinds of
intervention can overlap, frustrate, and generate feedback for one another.
We expand on vulnerabilities in the legal architecture in Part III. Our
framework departs from the prevailing explanations of financial instability
implicit in concepts such as shadow banking (unregulated intermediation),
which highlight the boundary between the well-lit (regulated) and the shadowy
(unregulated) in finance.18 We are more concerned with pervasive under-
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FIN. L. 619, 623 (2012) (noting disagreements over the definition of shadow banking). Gerding has
argued that this framing of shadow banking as unregulated obscures how heavily law has intervened to
create shadow banking markets and how deeply intertwined the regulated banking sector is with shadow
banking markets. Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins, Unpublished
manuscript (Jan. 24, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990816;
GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 429-434, supra note 16.
19.
GERDING, supra note 16, at 383-84, 479.
20.
Cf. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1473 (2007) (noting that use of
legal fictions can conceal normative choices made in fashioning legal rules).
21.
See IMF GFSR, supra note 1, at 81.
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regulation, which can manifest itself, for example, in misalignment between
“made safe” and “labeled safe.” An asset that is labeled safe, but not made safe
enough for the way in which it is used, can lose value abruptly and set off
damaging chain reactions. If the asset is used widely and the threat of contagion
is high, the state may come under pressure to guarantee the difference between
“made” and “labeled,” and to absorb the spillover costs.
Governments and private actors can exploit misalignment over time.
Government officials can use labels to direct financing for their policy
priorities, betting that they would not have to pay out on the implicit guarantees
during their time in office. Market participants can boost their returns by
issuing or buying risky assets labeled safe, counting on the state to absorb
losses when risk materializes.
Misalignment is cyclical. It is easy to miss when credit is abundant, when
“relatively safe” looks indistinguishable from “absolutely safe,” and different
assets are used interchangeably as if they were risk-free. Risk-free labels look
like self-evident descriptions, while making contracts safer for bad times seems
unnecessary.19 A crisis makes risk apparent and forces realignment. Labels
either fail or are validated with government guarantees.
We end Part III with observations on the politics of safe assets. Safe asset
policies distribute resources on a large scale and nurture powerful
constituencies for risk-free treatment. Labels and technical jargon obscure the
vested interests and distributional effects.20
Part IV contains preliminary policy prescriptions. We argue that legal
intervention should promote dynamic monitoring and alignment among risk
attributes, safety labels, and the public safety net throughout the credit cycle.
Periodic stress tests applied to asset markets, rather than a subset of institutions,
can help gauge the likely impact on financial stability of certain assets losing
their safety. They can reveal contingent liabilities for the public sector, and
encourage timely intervention to reduce latent risks. In addition, we argue that
regulatory risk-free labels are especially problematic and should be
discouraged. As a first step, we argue for presumptively treating labels as
express guarantees by the labeling government.
We conclude with directions for further research. Economists have
described safe assets as the cornerstone of the global financial system,21 the
essential ingredient of finance in danger of getting “squelched” by overzealous
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regulation22 — and at the opposite extreme, as a dangerous falsehood, a mutant
meme whose replication must be stopped.23 Legal fictions have elicited similar
rhetoric for centuries: Jeremy Bentham memorably described them as “a
syphilis,” a lie that makes the law rot from within.24 Courts, legislatures, and
administrators today show no sign of abandoning fictions.25 So, too, with safe
assets. In a world where no contract is risk-free, they meet functional needs of
market participants and policymakers to act “as if.” The law is essential to
constructing safe assets; it is just as essential to managing the risks they pose
for financial stability.
I. What Are Safe Assets, What Do They Do, and Why Do They Matter?
At the highest level of generality, a safe asset is a financial contract used
as if it were risk-free for one or more purposes. The phrase “safe asset” has
appeared in economic research, policy papers, and law review articles for
decades.26 Until recently, it did not denote a general phenomenon or a policy
challenge, but rather described low-risk investments, or served as shorthand for
modeling assumptions.27 The words “safe,” “riskless,” or “risk-free” remained
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22.
See Gorton et al., supra note 5.
23.
See Richard Portes, The Safe Asset Meme, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS (June 2013),
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/institute/events/2013/526Portesslides.pdf.
24.
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL
JURIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW 62 (1821).
25.
For a sampling of contemporary scholarship, see, for example, John A. Miller, Liars
Should Have Good Memories: Legal Fictions and the Tax Code, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1993); and
Schane, supra note 11; Seema K. Shah & Franklin G. Miller, Can We Handle the Truth? Legal Fictions
in the Determination of Death, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 540 (2010). For administrative and legislative uses
of legal fictions, see, for example, Life at Conception Act, H.R. 1091, 113th Cong. § 3(1) (2013), which
states that “[t]he terms ‘human person’ and ‘human being’ include each and every member of the
species homo sapiens at all stages of life, including the moment of fertilization, cloning, or other
moment at which an individual member of the human species comes into being”; and SOCIAL SEC.
ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK §1721, http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home%2Fhandbook/
handbook.17/handbook-1721.html (last visited May 5, 2015), which notes that the SSA presumes a
person is dead if he or she has been missing from home and has not been heard from for seven years or
more.
26.
A search of IMF, NBER, and Westlaw databases located hundreds of mentions between
1980 and 2007. A search for the phrase “safe asset” in the IMF eLibrary, which contains the IMF’s
periodicals, books, working papers, studies, data and statistical tools resulted in 49 returns between 1980
and 2007 and 36 returns between 2008 and 2014. See IMF ELIBRARY, http://www.elibrary.imf.org (last
visited August 25, 2016). A search for the phrase “safe asset” or “safe assets” on National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) Working Papers, a database segment consisting of papers and articles
published in journals, resulted in 8 articles and papers between 1980 and 2007 and 18 articles and papers
between 2008 and 2014. See NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org (last visited August 25,
2016). A search for the phrase “safe asset” on WestLaw’s Law Reviews & Journals database yielded 49
articles between 1980 and 2007 and 60 articles between 2008 and 2014.
27.
The following examples are typical. In economics, JOHN LIPSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS 34 (1983) (describing “institutional investors
seeking relatively safe assets”); Peter Diamond & John Geanakoplos, Social Security Investment in
Equities I: Linear Case 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 7103, 1999) (“We assume
that the returns to the real assets are such that both risky and safe assets are held in equilibrium when the
safe asset exists.”); Morris Goldstein & Geoffrey Woglom, Market-Based Fiscal Discipline in Monetary
Unions: Evidence From the U.S. Municipal Bond Market 8 (IMF Working Paper No. 91/89, 1991)
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enclosed in quotation marks or preceded by “relatively.” Financial crises in the
United States and Europe put safe assets at the center of public debates in the
financial press and made them the focus of attention in elite academic and
policy circles.
A. Functions and Attributes: An Overview
The IMF’s 2012 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR)28 was a
milestone in safe assets’ rise to prominence. In a chapter entitled Safe Assets:
Financial System Cornerstone?, the GFSR described a set of financial contracts
that performed critical functions and were sometimes used interchangeably
across financial markets. Their combined volume exceeded annual global
economic output.29 The GFSR identified five principal functions of safe assets:
•
•
•
•
•

as a store of value and portfolio capital cushion;
as collateral in repo and derivatives markets;
as a pricing benchmark for riskier assets;
as a tool in monetary policy operations; and
as part of compliance with solvency and liquidity regulations.30

This list is influential, but it is far from the only possible taxonomy, and
need not be exhaustive.31 For example, safe assets in the form of cash, demand
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(referring to safe assets as a baseline for bond interest rates); Garry J. Schinasi et al., Asset Price
Inflation in the 1980’s: A Flow of Funds Perspective 21 (IMF Working Paper No. 93/77, 1993)
(describing U.S. depository institutions taking on risk by “selling safe assets and retaining the relatively
risky ones such as commercial mortgages”). In law, Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate
Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV.
377, 401 (1992) (considering the effects of taxation on investment choices, as when “the combination of
taxable gains and nonrefundable losses will reduce the expected return of risky assets below the return
of safe assets, causing all investors to purchase riskless assets”); Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H.
Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 215, 218 (1988) (arguing that deposit insurance distorts bank managers’ incentives
because “a managerial decision to shift the bank’s loan portfolio from a set of relatively safe assets to a
set of highly risky assets will not affect in any way the interest the bank must pay to attract deposits”).
28.
IMF GFSR, supra note 1; compare Portes, supra note 23, at 5 (noting the role of IMF
GFSR in validating and raising the profile of what the author describes as a harmful “safe asset meme”).
29.
See
GDP
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
30.
IMF GFSR, supra note 1, at 88-90.
31.
For example, Peter Fisher identifies six functions of “risk-free” assets. See Peter R. Fisher,
Reflections on the Meaning of “Risk-Free,” in BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, SOVEREIGN RISK: A
WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS? 65 (2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72.pdf
[hereinafter BIS, A WORLD WITHOUT]. Other authors in the same BIS volume focus on a subset of safe
asset functions performed by government debt, most often its role in asset pricing and portfolio
construction. See, e.g., Alberto Giovannini, Risk-Free Assets in Financial Markets, in BIS, A WORLD
WITHOUT 73; Hiroshi Nakaso, Financial Markets without a Risk-Free Sovereign, in BIS, A WORLD
WITHOUT 79; Sergei Storchak, Risk-Free Assets: An Unreachable Dream or a Must, in BIS, A WORLD
WITHOUT 82. Similarly, Garry Schinasi and co-authors describe the financial market functions of
government debt in 2001 as interest rate benchmarks, interest rate hedging, liquidity management,
investment, and safe haven. Garry J. Schinasi, Charles F. Kramer & R. Todd Smith, Financial
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deposits, and short-term debt are widely used as a source of liquidity or
payment media; these functions are subsumed in other line items and discussed
throughout the report.
IMF researchers also did not discover safe asset functions. These
functions are instantly recognizable, with minor variations, as staples in
twentieth century finance theory, thoroughly embedded in financial market
practice. The starting point in these theories is a hypothetical (fictional) riskfree contract or interest rate, which enables market participants to evaluate risks
as departures from the riskless reference point. Theories of portfolio
construction posit, in simplified form, that any given investor preference for
risk, return, and volatility can be satisfied with a mix of “risk-free” and risky
securities.32 Risk-averse actors such as commercial banks or government
reserve managers might insist on keeping healthy cushions of assets
approximating the theory’s risk-free investments, to support risk-taking
elsewhere in their portfolios.33 Theories of liquidity preference hold that
economic actors prefer to keep some cash, or “risk-free” financial instruments
they can quickly turn into cash, to meet transactional needs and to pursue
investment opportunities.34 It follows that all savers might hold some safe
assets as cash substitutes for current transactions; that savers might hold more
safe assets when returns on risky assets are low; and that even traders with
healthy risk appetites might demand cash-like, liquid collateral, both to hedge
against particular transaction risks and to ensure access to cash for new
investment opportunities.35 Finally, asset pricing models typically stipulate a
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Implications of the Shrinking Supply of U.S. Treasury Securities, INT’L MONETARY FUND 12-15 (Mar.
20, 2001), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/supply/2001/eng/032001.pdf. While Schinasi and coauthors, among others, worried about the shrinking supply of U.S. Treasury securities from shrinking
budget deficits at the turn of the 21st century, Bratton considered the implications of Treasury default
and the consequent loss of the safe asset status for U.S. Treasury securities amid the deficits and debt
ceiling battles of 2012. Like the earlier authors preoccupied with budget surpluses, he highlights
benchmark and hedging functions of U.S. Treasuries and concludes that “a world without Treasuries” is
one where asset pricing and portfolio construction would be less efficient. William W. Bratton, A World
Without Treasuries?, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT? 18-19 (Franklin Allen, Anna Gelpern,
Charles
Mooney,
&
David
Skeel,
eds.,
2012),
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/FIC/FICPress/usdebt.pdf.
32.
See, e.g., Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); James Tobin, Liquidity
Preference as Behavior Towards Risk, 25 REV. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958) (providing early foundational
iterations of portfolio theory, depicting an optimal portfolio for a risk-averse investor as a mix of riskfree and risky assets). A leading account of how finance theory became embedded in financial market
practice is DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL MODELS SHAPE
MARKETS (2006, 2008) (discussing portfolio theory at 45-51).
33.
This example illustrates safe asset functions (i) and (v) in the list above, with bank
regulators requiring the safety cushion on the banks’ behalf.
34.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 194-209 (1936) (classifying motives for holding money as income, business, precautionary and
speculative; the first two motives are transactional); Tobin, supra note 32, at 65-66 (drawing on
Keynes).
35.
These examples illustrate safe asset functions (i), (ii), and (v) in the list above. As noted in
the preceding paragraph, liquidity could just as easily be a separate line item in the functions list.
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“risk-free” rate of return—to isolate “the price of time”36—and express the
risks associated with particular assets as a spread over the risk-free rate.37 Such
models help explain demand for interest rate benchmarks that can stand in for
the theory’s risk-free rate and, from a policy perspective, that can transmit
interest rate signals cleanly and quickly across the economy.38
The GFSR contribution (or infraction, depending on your perspective)39
was to observe that many different assets were being used, often
interchangeably, as if they were risk-free, for different functions. This insight is
significant because each theoretical function emphasizes different risks and
consequently demands different asset safety attributes.40 At a minimum, a safe
asset must deliver fixed repayment on time (this helps explain why debt and
debt-like contracts dominate the category).41 It should minimize credit and
idiosyncratic risks. In addition, an asset makes a good store of value if it has
minimal inflation and exchange rate risk—retaining value over time, even if it
is not fully liquid. Good trading collateral should have a deep market and a
stable price, so that lenders can instantly turn it into cash at face value. Shortterm instruments are prevalent in this category of safe assets. Deep markets and
stable prices are also important for benchmark instruments; however, to supply
reference prices for a variety of risky assets, benchmarks need to span a broader
maturity spectrum. Assets used by central banks in monetary policy operations
must also be liquid to convey policy signals. It is harder to pin down common
attributes for safe assets used in regulatory compliance. Each government
might define a different set in light of its policy objectives. However,
governments also coordinate among themselves.42
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36.
William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under
Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 426 (1964) (depicting asset risk as a combination of the price of time,
or “pure interest rate risk,” and the price of risk particular to the asset).
37.
See, e.g., Robert C. Merton, An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model, 41
ECONOMETRICA 867 (1973); Stephen Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 13 J. ECON.
THEORY 341 (1976).
38.
This illustrates safe asset functions (iii) and (iv) in the list above.
39.
See Portes, supra note 23, at 31; Fisher, supra note 31, at 67.
40.
There is further variation among safe assets in practice, because market participants use a
variety of stand-ins for model assumptions, depending on availability. See Bratton, supra note 31, at 14
(observing that both 10-year and 30-year Treasury securities are used as proxies for the risk-free rate).
41.
See Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation,
45 J. FIN. 49, 65-66 (1990). Holmstrom expands on the idea of debt, and especially over-collateralized
debt (very broadly defined), as a contract designed to deliver full payoff at a specified time, so much so
that it requires little or no information discovery ex ante. At the other extreme, equity is a risk-sharing
vehicle with varied returns, so that it pays to acquire information about the stock. Holmstrom notes
starkly, “[e]quity is information-sensitive while debt is not.” Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role
of Debt in the Financial System 7 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Papers No. 479, 2015). We
return to the information sensitivity point later in this Part II. See also, Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps
and Shadow Banking 8 U.VA.L. REV (forthcoming 2017).
42.
IMF GFSR, supra note 1, at 84, 95-101; Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Olivier Jeanne,
Global Safe Assets 53 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 399, 2012),
http://www.bis.org/publ/work399.pdf; Fisher, supra note 31, at 68. On regulatory coordination, see, for
example, CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2011) and Pierre-Hugues
Verdier, The Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405 (2013).

38137 yar_33-2 Sheet No. 34 Side A

11/18/2016 10:27:53

04 GELPERN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/16 10:36 PM

Inside Safe Assets
Assets with multiple safety attributes may have multiple functions,
sometimes in different markets. Government debt is a particularly versatile safe
asset since it often combines low credit risk and a deep and liquid market.43 On
the other hand, some functions can be accommodated with more than one safe
asset. Government debt and bank deposits function as stores of value and, in
the case of short-term debt and demand deposits, as transactional reserves. Both
highly rated corporate debt and government debt have served as benchmarks, or
proxies for pure interest rate risk.44 Government debt and securitization claims
have been used as substitutes to meet regulatory and trading requirements.45
In practice, the term “safe assets” describes a varied and dynamic set.
Under favorable credit conditions, contract and portfolio construction
techniques can produce lots of new, bespoke safe assets to feed demand in
different asset and geographical markets. Simple debt contracts become inputs
in more complex and leveraged structures piggybacking on their safety.46 More
assets look safe “in general,” and come to substitute for one another. As they
proliferate, safe assets knit together disparate parts of the financial system,
where different actors use them as ingredients in designing a variety of
contracts. In crisis, these connections can become pathways for contagion.
In theory and in market usage, the safety of safe assets works as a binary
proposition: an asset is either safe, or it is not. This is most apparent in trading
and liquidity management, where collateral often needs to change hands
instantaneously, “no questions asked.” On the other hand, safe assets are only
useful if economic actors can count on them to stay safe for a long time.
Otherwise, traders would have to invest in figuring out what is safe on any
given day, and no asset could be traded “no questions asked.”47 As a result,
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43.
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 14 (arguing that government securities function as
“base money” in the capital markets); see also, Schinasi et al., supra note 31, at 13-14.
44.
Fisher points out that highly rated corporate debt, not government debt, was used as a safe
asset for many purposes as recently as the 1970s. Fisher, supra note 31, at 76. The fact that the interest
rate on risk-free debt is generally above zero illustrates a tension at the heart of the concept.
45.
See Ben S. Bernanke et al., International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in
the United States, 2003-2007 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Int’l Fin. Discussion Papers
No. 1014, 2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1014/ifdp1014.pdf. Substitution does
not necessarily require that the assets be treated identically for regulatory purposes. For example,
government debt and securitization claims held by banks may be subject to different capital
requirements, but both may be more favorable than a simple corporate bond.
46.
Viral V. Acharya et al., Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of
2007-2009, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS IN FIN. 247, 258 (2010) (examining growth and drivers of
securitization and re-securitization). Some economists make a distinction in the safe asset literature
between “inside” liquidity – that is assets that represent claims on financial firms and are traded within
the financial sector – and “outside” liquidity – assets that represent claims on governments, nonfinancial businesses, or households. See, e.g., Bengt Holmström & Jean Tirole, Private and Public
Supply of Liquidity, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1998); Gourinchas & Jeanne, supra note 42, at 9-10 (adapting
concepts in Holmström & Tirole to account for private safe assets); see also Ben S. Bernanke et al.,
supra note 45, at 13-16 (“pooling loans and establishing tranches with a pre-established priority ordering
for payments allowed many securities to be deemed much safer than the average loan in the underlying
pool.” ).
47.
We are grateful to Olivier Jeanne for this formulation. See also Harold Cole, Daniel
Neuhann & Guillermo Ordonez, Debt Crises: For Whom the Bell Tolls, (working paper, 2015),
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perceptions of safety tend to become entrenched: safe assets come to rest on a
shared belief in their safety, and a societal commitment to act as if that safety is
absolute, even though risk remains continuous.48 When such beliefs are
dislodged, the result is a shock, an abrupt loss in value, followed by contagion.
Governments and private firms deploy financial engineering and legal
tools to produce safe assets. Both can design contracts and capital structures to
ensure payoff, using features such as tiered cash flows, short maturity, and
collateral.49 However, only governments can collect taxes, issue money, and
regulate the economy. These powers support the safety of public debt in more
states of the world. Governments can also extend these powers and the public
safety net selectively to bolster the safety of private contracts, as we elaborate
in Part III.
Safe asset supply and demand fluctuate with the credit cycle, but public
and private safe assets behave differently. In a credit boom, many public and
private contracts look safe, substitute for one another, and serve as inputs in
new private safe assets. In a low-interest rate environment, private market
participants can produce safe assets to exploit arbitrage opportunities, such as
small differences in the rates of return on different contracts that are treated as
if they were equally safe for some purposes.50 Financial crises follow rapid
growth in private safe assets.51 Private safe assets as a group have a poor track
record of keeping their value in crisis; even those that were uncorrelated in
good times lose their safety together.52 Public safe assets, such as government
debt and money, are more likely to remain safe when private safe assets
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http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~ordonez/pdfs/CNO.pdf (modeling contagion in sovereign debt markets as a
function of information acquisition dynamics).
48.
See Holmström, supra note 41 at 13-16, citing S. Morris and H.S. Shin, Optimal
Communication, 5 J. OF EUR. ECON. ASS’N 594 (2007) and S. Morris and H.S. Shin, Contagious
Adverse Selection, 4 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 1 (2012) on “shared understanding” and
“commonality of beliefs” underlying liquidity in the money markets. Cf. RILES, supra note 11,
describing a “collective commitment” to act as if legal fictions were facts.
49.
We explore private ordering in more detail in the companion symposium essay, Public and
Private Ordering in Safe Asset Markets, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97 (2016); cf. RILES, supra
note 11, at 4 (observing that public and private actors can use the same legal techniques, such as
collateral, to manage or assume away risk); Markus K. Brunnermeier et al., European Safe Bonds
(ESBies) (Sept. 30, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.columbia.edu/~rr2572/papers/11
-ESBies.pdf (applying structured finance techniques to produce senior (safe) and subordinated euro area
public debt); see also Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 41.
50.
See infra Part II.B.1; Bernanke et al., supra note 45, at 7.
51.
See, e.g., Gourinchas & Jeanne, supra note 42, at 1-2.
52.
See id. at 36-37 (arguing that private safe assets are not designed to withstand shocks).
Correlations that hold in good times break down in crisis. As a result, assets that could be used for
portfolio hedging before can no longer perform this function. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 31, at 17;
Schinasi et al., supra note 31, at 14. Both papers describe the breakdown in correlations leading up to
and following the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in the fall of 1998. See HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, Report of the President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets (April 1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin
-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf (providing the official account of the LTCM incident and the market
disruptions, including breakdowns in correlations and flight to safety, before and after the fund’s
collapse).
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collapse.53 Governments can rescue private safe assets by replacing them with
money and public debt.54 However, only a few governments have effectively
unlimited capacity to issue money and debt. Even public safe assets can start to
look risky, and launch a vicious cycle that brings down banks and financial
markets.55
We have described safe assets so far as a family of contracts that solve
specific market or policy problems expressed in established, institutionally
embedded theoretical models. These contracts can be engineered to minimize
particular risks and adapted to multiple uses. They are used on a vast scale
across different markets. Table 1, adapted from the IMF GFSR taxonomy that
began this Part, illustrates the range of financial contracts assets, the functions
they perform, and the actors that use them.
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53.
See, e.g., Brunnermeier & Haddad, supra note 13, at 5.
54.
See, e.g., Ricardo J. Caballero & Emmanuel Farhi, The Safety Trap (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 19927, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19927; Gary B. Gorton &
Guillermo Ordoñez, The Supply and Demand for Safe Assets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 18732, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18732; Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 41, at
62; Robin M. Greenwood et al., A Comparative-Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity, J.
OF FIN. (forthcoming), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:14011000.
55.
See, e.g., Jay C. Shambaugh, The Euro’s Three Crises, BROOKINGS INST. 191 (2012)
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Spring%202012/2012a_Shambaugh.pdf (describing
the progression from banking to government debt crisis in Ireland, and the associated feedback loops);
David Gardner et al., Ireland: A Punt Too Far, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c1236fbc-f41e-11df-886b-00144feab49a.html; see also Brunnermeier et
al., supra note 49, at 2-3 (describing a structured regional debt instrument).
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The table highlights the extent to which the same contracts are held by
different state and market actors for different purposes, and the widespread
practice of using safe assets as ingredients in other safe assets. Virtually all the
users of safe assets in the left-hand column also issue safe assets, listed in the
top row. Researchers have also suggested that users may rely on one another
either to acquire or to ignore information about particular safe assets. For
example, if banks buy ABS “no questions asked,” it may be reasonable for
mutual funds, traders, and corporate treasurers to do the same—especially
when credit is ample.56 Extending this reasoning, if any category of users is no
longer willing to treat an asset as safe, perceptions of risk could spike up and
down the column. The loss of safety can deliver a severe balance sheet shock to
some users, and lead to further contagion across the board.
Having roughly defined safe assets as a functional category of financial
contracts and situated them against the background of post-crisis concerns
about financial stability, we now turn to the prevailing economic theories of
safe asset supply and demand.
B. Theories of Safe Assets
1. Safe Assets as a Global Store of Value
An early and influential strand of safe asset scholarship in the mid-2000s
sought to explain capital flows from countries with high foreign currency
savings and unmet development needs. Instead of investing at home,
governments in these countries bought U.S. Treasury and GovernmentSponsored Enterprise (GSE or Agency) securities.57 Some economists
attributed this preference to the combination of governments’ extreme riskaversion, desire to self-insure against crisis, and inability to produce domestic
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56.
Cole et al. model contagion in sovereign debt markets as a function of similar strategic
complementarity in information acquisition. See Cole et al., supra note 47, at 32-41. For the theory to
apply to safe assets more broadly, market participants would need to believe, for example, that
information sought or ignored by banks for portfolio hedging purposes would be equally relevant to
traders, money market funds, and reserve managers.
57.
Ricardo J. Caballero et al., An Equilibrium Model of “Global Imbalances” and Low
Interest Rates, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 358 (2008); Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Global
Imbalances and Financial Fragility (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14688, 2009),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14688. “Agency debt” refers to securities issued or backed by U.S.
housing finance agencies, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae. Fannie Mae (the Federal National
Mortgage Association or FNMA) and Freddie Mac (the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or
FHLMC) were taken over by the U.S. government in 2008. Even before the takeover, they were widely
perceived as fully backed by the U.S. Government. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09
-782, FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC: ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR REVISING THE HOUSING
ENTERPRISES’ LONG-TERM STRUCTURES 3 (2009). Ginnie Mae (the Government National Mortgage
Association or GNMA) has been wholly owned by the U.S. government since its establishment in 1968.
See
Ginnie
Mae
&
the
GSEs,
GINNIE
MAE,
http://www.ginniemae.gov/consumer_education/Pages/ginnie_mae_and_the_gses.aspx (last updated
Feb. 25, 2013).
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stores of value; others blamed exchange rate policies.58 This account of safe
asset demand and scarcity emphasizes contracts’ function as a store of value
and a risk-free component in the portfolios of risk-averse investors. It adds a
global dimension to the theory.59 In some developing countries with large
export earnings, domestic capital markets are thin and illiquid, while domestic
investment opportunities are risky. The debt of rich, large, and stable
economies offers developing country governments protection against volatility
in cross-border capital flows and reduces currency mismatches between their
assets and liabilities. In this way, risk aversion and higher government savings
in low and middle-income countries feed demand for foreign government debt,
and potentially contribute to global scarcity.
A later study by Ben Bernanke and co-authors at the U.S. Federal Reserve
pointed to the implications of global store of value theories for private financial
institutions and markets, and highlighted the role of regulatory arbitrage in safe
asset demand.60 Unlike surplus country governments, banks in Europe and
elsewhere did not have excess savings, nor were they infinitely risk-averse.
They bought complex securitized debt with borrowed money. The authors
suggested that banks took advantage of capital adequacy regulations to use offbalance sheet vehicles to invest in “private label” mortgage-backed securities
(MBS), engineered to minimize credit risk, instead of buying and holding U.S.
Treasury and Agency debt.61 Banks earned a higher return, but were not
required to hold substantially more capital against what turned out to be much
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58.
We stay out of the vigorous debate between those who explain such demand as a function
of exchange rate manipulation by China and other exporters, and those who argue that they are
motivated by emerging market governments’ desire to save and the scarcity of investment vehicles
available to them. It affects our argument on the margins; we return to it briefly in the conclusion. See,
e.g., C. FRED BERGSTEN & JOSEPH E. GAGNON, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., CURRENCY
MANIPULATION, THE US ECONOMY, AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER (2012); MARC LABONTE &
JARED C. NAGEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22331, FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF FEDERAL DEBT 5 (2014)
(“Foreign official holdings are motivated primarily by a desire for a liquid and stable store of value for
foreign reserves; relatively few assets besides U.S. Treasury securities fill this role well. Depending on
the country, foreign reserves may be accumulated as a result of a country’s exchange rate policy . . . .”);
BRAD W. SETSER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH AND SOVEREIGN POWER
(2008); Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, The US as a Net Debtor: The Sustainability of the US External
Imbalances (Nov. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/papers/Roubini
-Setser-US-External-Imbalances.pdf.
59.
The domestic view of government debt as a safe asset is aptly described in a speech by
Russia’s government debt manager in 2013: “[T]he remarkable thing about risk-free assets is that any
sovereign needs to keep in mind that within its own territory there are hundreds if not thousands of
economic agents for whom sovereign bonds are risk-free assets, no matter what credit rating agencies
think about them.” Storchak, supra note 31, at 83. Caballero and others contend that some governments
are unable to produce or get private actors in their economies to produce enough safe assets to meet the
demand. See sources cited supra note 57 and infra note 61.
60.
Bernanke et al., supra note 45, at 13-14; see Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 1, at 1.
61.
Ricardo J. Caballero, The “Other” Imbalance and the Financial Crisis (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15636, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15636. Private-label
securities were not backed by Agency guarantees, were not subject to Agency underwriting standards,
and were not seen as having the implicit backing of the U.S. government.
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higher risk.62 The private safe assets at the heart of this arbitrage strategy
unraveled together in 2008.
The financial crisis story rests in important part on banks’ ability to
substitute MBS for U.S. Treasuries in good times, to treat both as if they were
safe, and to forgo self-insurance in the form of higher capital.63 In crisis,
substitution runs in reverse: the state must produce safe assets to make up for
the shortage of private ones.64 As we noted in the preceding section, such a
cyclical substitution pattern emerges as an important shared attribute of safe
assets.
2. Safe Assets as “Transactions Technology”
Post-crisis risk aversion and tighter regulation in mature markets motivate
a different strand of safe asset theories. Gary Gorton and co-authors have
described safe assets as an essential ingredient in financial risk-taking, a
poorly-understood “transactions technology.”65 Economists who write in this
vein study safe assets as collateral in trading, not as a long-term store of value.
They point out that the pool of available collateral shrinks when regulations
limit safe asset production or require firms to hold safe assets as buffers against
shocks.66
Gorton and co-authors argue that a shortage of high-quality collateral may
drive traders to use risky collateral as if it were safe.67 First, they observe that
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62.
See Bernanke et al., supra note 45, at 14. The arbitrage strategy took advantage of banks’
ability to hold MBS off-balance sheet, and of lower capital requirements for MBS, compared to ordinary
corporate debt. For an account of regulatory arbitrage in law scholarship, see, e.g., Victor Fleischer,
Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2011). Bernanke and co-authors also fault loose
underwriting standards in the United States for allowing the system to manufacture large volumes of
risky debt that could be used as if it were safe.
63.
See Gourinchas & Jeanne, supra note 42, at 1-2; Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette
Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt, 120 J. POL. ECON. 233 (2012); see also
Caballero & Farhi, supra note 54, at 2-3 (discussing substitutability of safe assets). Surplus country
governments and banks had subtly different objectives. While both might have sought U.S. dollar
investments with minimal credit risk, the banks optimized risk and return while engaging in regulatory
arbitrage.
64.
See Gorton & Ordoñez, supra note 54, at 26; Gourinchas & Jeanne, supra note 42, at 1-2;
see also Simon Wren-Lewis, Safe Assets and Government Debt, MAINLYMACRO (Jan. 16, 2013, 1:12
PM),
http://mainlymacro.blogspot.com/2013/01/safe-assets-and-government-debt.html
(surveying
arguments for reliance on public production of safe assets).
65.
Gorton et al., supra note 5, at 101, 105 (“The production of total assets appears to require
safe debt as an input. Little is known about this transactions technology.”).
66.
See, e.g., Cardiff Garcia, The Decline of “Safe” Assets, FTALPHAVILLE (Dec. 5, 2011,
9:23 am) http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2011/12/05/778301/the-decline-of-safe-assets; Gorton et al., supra
note 5, at 105; CREDIT SUISSE FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, 2012 GLOBAL OUTLOOK: PIECING TOGETHER
OR FALLING TO PIECES 143 (Dec. 1, 2011) https://doc.research-and
-analytics.csfb.com/docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&source_id=em&document_id=932631241;
John Carney, How the Crash of Safe Assets Fueled the Financial Crisis, CNBC (Jan. 13, 2014, 12:54
PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101327578.
67.
Gorton et al., supra note 5, at 105 (“Small policy changes . . . may well drive activity
further into the shadow banking sector. Furthermore, since the demand for safe assets is roughly
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the ratio of safe assets to total financial assets in the U.S. economy (the “safe
asset share”) has stayed between 30% and 35% from 1952 to 2010, while the
ratio of financial assets as a share of the U.S. economy more than doubled.68
Their study suggests that the safe asset share determines the size of the
financial sector, but stops short of making the link to economic growth.69 It
argues that a shortage of safe assets would either slow financial sector growth,
or, if growth continues despite the shortage, would push the frontier of safety
into ever-riskier territory.
Safe assets as transactions technology are binary: safe or not. This quality
is captured in the concept of “information-insensitive” debt, which makes for
ideal collateral because it trades “no questions asked.”70 The moment it pays to
research the risk attributes of a contract, it no longer qualifies as safe. A related
paper co-authored by Gorton points to the perils of discontinuity: informationinsensitive debt is prone to crashes and amplifies shocks to the financial
system.71
For proponents of transaction technology theories, information-insensitive
debt is a fact of life and basically a good thing. Securitization and other forms
of private safe asset production respond to an organic market need. The state
might insure, license and supervise the issuers, but cannot and should not try to
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constant, attempts to squelch the shadow banking sector would simply push the production of safe debt
into another, less efficient sector.”).
68.
Gorton et al., supra note 5, at 103, 105. The authors calculate the safe asset share based on
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data. They start with total liabilities produced by the government and
financial sector. They then make a series of adjustments including removing government liabilities held
by other governmental entities, removing certain financial sector liabilities (such as mutual fund shares)
on the theory that these are not information-insensitive, and assume that 85% of mortgage-backed
securities and other asset-backed securities are information-insensitive and qualify as safe assets. On the
other hand, accounts using different metrics point to a sharp decline in federal government debt relative
to the size of the U.S. credit market, from 50% to less than 20% between 1946 and 1974, as the
economy grew and the government paid off wartime debt. See Schinasi, supra note 31, at 7.
69.
Gorton et al., supra note 5, at 104-05. The literature distinguishing between “inside”
liquidity (claims on financial firms traded within the financial sector) and “outside” liquidity (claims on
the real economy—governments, non-financial businesses, or households) is relevant here. See BENGT
HOLMSTRÖM & JEAN TIROLE, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE LIQUIDITY 7-9 (2011); see also Gourinchas &
Jeanne, supra note 42, at 9 (applying concepts of inside and outside liquidity to safe assets). Findings
about the safe asset share do not distinguish between safe assets that originate and contribute to growth
in the real economy, and those that originate and fuel growth in the financial sector.
70.
Information-insensitive debt is “immune to adverse selection in trading because agents
have no desire to acquire private information about the current health of the issuer.” Gorton et al., supra
note 5, at 101; see also Holmström, supra note 41, Tri Vi Dang et al., Ignorance, Debt and Financial
Crises
(Mar.
11,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.columbia.edu/~td2332/Paper_Ignorance.pdf, and Judge, supra note 41. Judge highlights
“information gaps” inherent in information-insensitive debt as a feature of unregulated capital markets
intermediation, or shadow banking, that contributes to financial instability.
71.
Crashes follow from discontinuity between information-insensitive and informationsensitive debt; the tendency to amplify follows from the view of safe assets as the common glue that
binds transactions across the financial system. See Table 1, Part I.A supra, and Dang et al., supra note
70, at 36-37 (summarizing theoretical findings on the optimality of “debt-on-debt,” or debt collateralized
by other debt in the money markets; describing a financial crisis as a response to the loss of information
insensitivity; observing that fire-sales of formerly safe collateral at a deep discount can help restore
information insensitivity).
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stop the activity. Regulations that unduly limit regulated firms’ ability to create
safe assets almost by definition “squelch” natural processes, interfere with
critical economic functions, and ultimately backfire, increasing risk in the
system.72 For critics, information-insensitive debt is a source of distortion and a
way to hide tail risks.73 Our analysis of legal architecture in Part II questions
the portrayal of regulation as a constraint on natural forces in the transactions
technology story; in our view, the thicket of enabling interventions to construct
safe assets leaves little room for organic supply and demand.
C. Safe Assets, Money, and Government Debt
The relationship between safe assets and money is not straightforward and
requires further clarification for purposes of this Article. Money has been
described as “the safe asset par excellence,”74 or even as the only safe asset.75
In this Article we treat fiat money issued by a sovereign central bank and used
as legal tender (including cash) as a subset of safe assets, at the safest extreme
of the spectrum.76 Central bank money is also the most abstract safe asset: it is
safe so long as economic actors trust and obey the state.77 The safety of all
other safe assets—government bonds, bank deposits, repos and asset-backed
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72.
GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010) (arguing
that the production of informationally-insensitive debt outside the banking sector is a legitimate banking
activity, which should be licensed, insured, and supervised by the state). See also Gary Gorton et al., The
Safe-Asset Share, supra note 5 and the accompanying text (on “squelching” safe asset production).
73.
See, e.g., Felix Salmon, Is Informationally-Insensitive Debt a Good Thing?, REUTERS
(Apr. 15, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/04/15/is-informationally-insensitive-debt-a
-good-thing/ (criticizing informationally-insensitive debt as a repository of tail risk); see also Samuel G.
Hanson & Adi Sunderam, Are There Too Many Safe Securities? Securitization and the Incentives for
Information Production, 108 J. FIN. ECON 565 (2013) (arguing that economizing on knowledge
acquisition in bad times produces inefficiencies).
74.
See, e.g., Pierpaolo Benigno & Salvatore Nisticò, Safe Assets, Liquidity and Monetary
Policy, BANCA D’ITALIA 1 (2013), https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/altri-atti
-seminari/2014/20140324_Benigno_paper.pdf (“There are some safe assets, like money, which can be
perfect store of value and immediately resaleable . . . .”); Gourinchas & Jeanne, supra note 42, at 5.
75.
See, e.g., Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Remarks at the Conference on the ECB and its OMT
Programme: A Financial Market and Financial Stability Perspective on the OMT 9 (Sept. 2, 2013),
http://www.lorenzobinismaghi.com/documents/interventi/2013/berlin%20omt%20and%20ecb%202%20
sept%202013.pdf (“[I]nside money is the only safe asset in a fiat money system.”).
76.
Cash has no intrinsic value and derives its worth solely from the fact that a government
declares it to have value. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 326 (6th
ed. 2011).
77.
Market participants are willing to hold money if they trust the issuer to maintain its value.
For an extreme example, the U.S. dollar’s status as a global reserve currency is, in important part, a
function of trust in the Federal Reserve and the extensive network of dealers ensuring dollar liquidity
around the world. See Perry Mehrling, Essential Hybridity: A Money View of FX, 41 J. OF COMP. ECON.
355 (2013). At the other extreme, economic actors in a closed economy controlled by a totalitarian
government may have little choice but to obey the state and use its legal tender. Such money may have
no value beyond the jurisdiction of the state, but it can still function as safe domestically. Most
economies lie along the spectrum between these two examples. Describing money as a relatively simple
safe asset does not mean that the institutional arrangements behind it are simple. The constitution of
central bank money entails immensely weighty and complex political choices. CHRISTINE DESAN,
MAKING MONEY: COIN, BANK CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM (2014).
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securities, among others—is measured by their proximity to central bank
money.78 The safest of the rest can turn into central bank money at par on
demand. Legislation and regulation shape the relationship between central bank
money and all other financial contracts.
A strand of law scholarship closely related to our project addresses
“money claims,” or short-term stable-value debt used in transactions and
vulnerable to panic redemptions (runs).79 The focus of this literature is on
institutional design to produce optimal quantities of money claims, while
minimizing runs. Some scholars in this field reject any conflation of safe assets
and money.80
Our primary focus is not on preventing runs and designing more robust
short-term liabilities, although both are clearly relevant to our project. In this
Article, we consider the broader context in which any claim can be treated as
risk-free—whether because of its contract features, such as maturity, the assets
or collateral securing claim payoff, the claim’s seniority relative to other
liabilities, state oversight of the claim issuer, third party guarantees, or any
other factors.81 Understanding what makes a claim “safe” in the eyes of its
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78.
Long-term debt contracts can perform some of the same functions as short-term moneylike claims. They store value, serve as benchmarks for pricing other assets, balance portfolio risk, satisfy
regulatory requirements, and work as building blocks for other long- and short-term debt. For example,
an overnight sale and repurchase agreement (repo) of AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities transforms
an asset understood to be safe as a store of value into one that is also a medium of exchange. See,
Morrison et al., supra note 15, at 1034. (“These [U.S. Treasury repos] are nearly equivalent to cash, are
widely traded, and—due to government backing—[are] unlikely to lose their liquidity during crises.”).
These functions of long-term debt entail assumptions about safety that can fail abruptly, with dramatic
spillover effects. Panic sales of long-term debt that is no longer perceived as safe can drive down prices
of other assets and cause transaction and firm failures. A government debt crisis might manifest itself in
a failed attempt to refinance long-term bonds. Currency devaluation can trigger mass insolvency.
79.
By definition, long-term debt cannot be redeemed for cash on demand. As a result, it lacks
the transactional convenience (“moneyness”) and the vulnerability of short-term debt. On “moneyness,”
see Greenwood et al., supra note 54, at 6. For examples of legal scholarship addressing short-term
private claims that can function like money, see Margaret M. Blair, Making Money: Leverage and
Private Sector Money Creation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 417 (2013); RICKS, supra note 14; Adam J.
Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357 (2016); Hockett & Omarova,
supra note 14; Morrison et al., supra note 15; Chrystin Ondersma, Shadow Banking and Financial
Distress, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 79 (2013). For a canonical account of bank runs, see Douglas W.
Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401
(1983). On runs outside the banking system, see, for example, Tobias Adrian et al., Repo and Securities
Lending
(Fed.
Reserve
Bank
of
N.Y.,
Staff
Rep.
No.
529,
2013),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr529.pdf; Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick,
Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15223,
2009); IMF GFSR, supra note 1, at 97.
80.
See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1289, 1300 (defining characteristics of “money-claims”). This definition builds on traditional views of
the money supply. The Federal Reserve’s statistics divide the money supply into M1 and M2. See also,
Morgan Ricks, Reforming the Short-Term Funding Markets (Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law,
Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 713, 2012); Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage,
Bubbles, and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 229-32 (2010).
81.
Put in slightly more technical terms, assumptions about safety are present both on the asset
side and the liability side of financial intermediaries’ balance sheets. Money-like private claims are a
particularly fragile subset of liabilities. Ricks has proposed to make them safer by licensing and securing
claims on private issuers with claims on the state. The proposal rests on the assumption that the asset
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users is, in our view, a first step to assessing the risks from safe assets, and
designing an approach to manage such risks.
The economic literature we have surveyed in this Part describes a wide
range of circumstances where market participants treat more-or-less risky debt
contracts across the maturity spectrum as if they were risk-free. It offers no
explanation for how assumptions about safety might come and go. This
literature also documents the destructive potential of acting on these
assumptions but, lacking an institutional diagnosis, it does not supply a
framework for institutional response. Our Article begins to fill both gaps, and
extends to the political dimension of safe assets.82
D. Ongoing Controversies
Many parts of the economic literature on safe assets are contested. The
term “safe assets” can mean different things to different people, which makes it
look incoherent.83 The explanatory power of safe asset theories as applied to
the global financial crisis and its aftermath is also open to debate.84 However,
there is little disagreement about the basic fact that market participants treat
trillions of dollars’ worth of financial assets as if they were risk-free.
With empirical research in early stages, most policy questions posed in the
economic literature stand unanswered:
•

Whether there is a shortage of safe assets, and how one might
tell;85
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side of the money-issuing balance sheet can be made “default-free” with government insurance. See
Ricks, supra note 80, at 1290. We cannot make the same assumption because it is precisely what we are
investigating. For examples of contemporary proposals to reduce risks from money-like claims, see, for
example, MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING AND THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2016); George Pennacchi, Narrow Banking, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012) (banks
licensed to issue claims against a pool of U.S. Treasury securities); RICKS, supra note 14 (government
licensing, oversight and guarantees of all short-term claims); and Levitin, supra note 79 (100% reserve
banking, where deposit claims may be issued only against cash or short-term U.S. Treasury securities).
82.
Our interest in the distribution politics of safe assets relates closely to a strand of law
scholarship that explores the political and constitutional dimensions of central bank money. See, e.g.,
Christine Desan, Coin Reconsidered: The Political Alchemy of Commodity Money, 11 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 361 (2010); Roy Kreitner, The Jurisprudence of Global Money, 11 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 177 (2010).
83.
See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 31, at 3 (questioning the utility of combining disparate
functions and instruments under one term); Portes, supra note 23, at 11 (criticizing safe assets as a
damaging meme, and questioning the empirical claims in the literature).
84.
Id.
85.
See, e.g., Caballero, supra note 9, at 37; Caballero & Farhi, supra note 54, at 2; Fisher,
supra note 31, at 5; Gorton et al., supra note 5, at 105; IMF GFSR, supra note 5, at 11; Portes, supra
note 23, at 31; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., JOINT STAFF REPORT: THE U.S. TREASURY
MARKET ON OCTOBER 15, 2014 (2015), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press
-releases/Documents/Joint_Staff_Report_Treasury_10-15-2015.pdf.
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Whether governments should issue more or less debt for the sake
of financial stability, who should buy it, and how it should be
treated for regulatory purposes;86
Whether governments should avoid restructuring their bonds to
maintain their safe asset status at all costs, or move decisively to
reduce unsustainable debts;87
Whether private firms should be allowed to issue safe assets at all
and, if yes, on what conditions;88 and
Whether regulators should require banks to hold more safe, liquid
assets and what, if any, requirements along the same lines should
apply to non-bank financial firms that issue safe assets.89

We do not answer these questions directly below, but recast them. The
current policy debate about safe assets adopts a focus on shortages and gluts
from the macroeconomic literature, and mostly glosses over institutional and
political choices. We move these choices to the foreground. Instead of asking
whether state intervention would produce more or less safety, we ask how
different forms of intervention might distribute safety attributes across the
financial sector—for example, between bank intermediation and securities

C M
Y K

11/18/2016 10:27:53

386

38137 yar_33-2 Sheet No. 39 Side B

86.
See, e.g., Caballero & Farhi, supra note 54, at 35-36; Greenwood et al., supra note 54, at
23; Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S Banking System, supra
note 18, at 22 (arguing for more issuance of government debt); see, e.g., Charles A. E. Goodhart, The
Macro-Prudential Authority: Powers, Scope and Accountability, 2011 OECD J. 97; Nouy, supra note
11; Portes, supra note 23, at 32-33; ESRB, SOVEREIGN REPORT, supra note 12; Hervé Hannoun, Deputy
Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, Speech at the Financial Stability Institute High-Level
Meeting: Sovereign Risk in Bank Regulation and Supervision: Where Do We Stand? (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp111026.htm (arguing for raising risk premia, eliminating regulatory
privileges); Jens Weidmann, President of Deutsche Bundesbank, Speech at Harvard University:
Europe’s Monetary Union—Making It Prosperous and Resilient (Nov. 25, 2013),
http://www.bis.org/review/r131126b.htm.
87.
See, e.g., Hans J. Blommestein, The Debate on Sovereign Risk, Safe Assets and the RiskFree Rate: What are Possible Implications for Sovereign Issuers?, 1 EKONOMI-TEK 55 (2012); Ashoka
Mody, The Ghost of Deauville, VOXEU (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.voxeu.org/article/ghost-deauville
(criticizing general aversion to sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area); UBS Center, supra note 1
(observing the loss of safe assets status for euro area sovereign debt). But see Douglas A. Rediker &
Angel Ubide, A Disruptive Proposal for the IMF, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2014),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-02-17/a-disruptive-proposal-by-the-imf (criticizing IMF
insistence on debt restructuring where countries’ debts may not be sustainable, as a needless destruction
of safe assets).
88.
See, e.g., MARTIN WOLF, THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED—AND
HAVE STILL TO LEARN—FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2014); see also RICKS, supra note 14
(advocating restrictions on private sector money creation).
89.
IMF GFSR, supra note 1, at 115 (noting that Basel liquidity requirements create demand
pressure on safe asset markets); see also BASEL COMM. ON BANK SUPERVISION, Basel III: The Liquidity
Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf; FIN. STABILITY BD., Identifying the Effects of Regulatory Reforms
on Emerging Market and Developing Economies: A Review of Potential Unintended Consequences
(Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors) 15 (2012), http://www.fsb.org/wp
-content/uploads/r_120619e.pdf (summarizing concerns about the Basel III liquidity framework due to a
limited supply of high quality liquid assets (HQLA) in emerging and developing economies); see also
infra Part II.B.
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Inside Safe Assets
trading, or between public and private debt—and the subsidies implicit in this
act of distribution. We consider the tools of safe asset construction, the
respective roles of public and private ordering, and how public and private
actors might manipulate the tools for their own ends.
II. The Legal Architecture of Safe Assets
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90.
Dang et al., supra note 70, at 37.
91.
On private tools to make and guarantee safe assets, see, for example, William W. Bratton
& Adam J. Levitin, A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: From Michael Milken to Enron to Goldman
Sachs, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 800 (2013) (providing an autopsy of financial engineering and
transactional techniques used to create claims with desired risk characteristics); Anna Gelpern & Adam
J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: The Workout Prohibition in Residential Mortgage-Backed
Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1077, 1084-85 (2009) (describing formal, structural, and functional
approaches to creating “rigid contracts” immune from variations in payoff). On labeling by private
credit rating agencies, see, for example, Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in 9 RATINGS,
RATINGS AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65 (Richard M. Levich et al., eds., 2002);
and Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1998).
92.
For example, sponsors of asset-backed securitizations used pre-existing features of U.S.
bankruptcy law, such as the limited definition of entities eligible to file for bankruptcy protection, to
insulate securitized asset pools from restructuring in bankruptcy. Bratton & Levitin, supra note 91, at
801; Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 91, at 1094-98.
93.
See sources cited in supra note 14 on public-private collaboration. Our framing implies
that purely private safe assets are rare. Even if the state were not involved in designing or endorsing the
safety attributes, at a minimum, the assets’ systemic importance raises the possibility that they would be
guaranteed ex post. This does not mean that private ordering is unimportant, but simply that it has limits.
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Safe assets are deliberately constructed, nurtured, and adapted to meet the
needs of particular constituents. Public and private actors make, label, and
guarantee contracts to pay off in full and on time. Making a contract safe
combines financial engineering and legal design to reduce risks to payoff. At
the extreme, it is possible to reduce some risks to the point where they could be
ignored, at least for some purposes. However, risk reduction is always
relative—it never goes down to zero. A contract is labeled safe to attract
buyers. An effective label dissuades market participants from acquiring
additional information about the asset.90 Guarantees import safety from the
outside, when issuer and contract attributes are not enough to secure risk-free
treatment.
In this Part, we spell out our framework for analyzing public intervention
in safe assets. We describe the architecture of making, labeling, and guarantees,
before turning to the risks in Part III.
As we illustrate in Table 2 and elaborate below, the basic three-part
architecture of intervention is the same for public and private safe assets.91
However, states have a wider range of tools at their disposal than private
market participants, by virtue of their powers to tax, print money, and regulate.
States use their tools purposefully to endorse the safety of some private
contracts and lend safety attributes to others. For their part, market participants
design contracts around laws and institutions.92 Most safe assets grow out of
continuous public-private collaboration.93

38137 yar_33-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B

11/18/2016 10:27:53

04 GELPERN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/16/16 10:36 PM

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 33, 2016

In Table 2, we separate legal intervention tools that operate primarily on
institutions that issue safe assets, in the top half of the table, and those that
operate on financial contracts directly, to transform them into safe assets. We
highlight private ordering tools in italics.
Table 2: The Safety Toolkit—Public and Private Ordering

Issuer

Asset

Made Safe
Chartering qualifications (e.g., “fit and
proper”)
Balance sheet regulation prescribing
Asset composition, incl. liquidity
coverage
Tiered (senior-subordinate) liabilities
Net stable funding
Minimum capital
Activity restrictions
Affiliation restrictions
Risk retention
Portfolio construction
Tiered (senior-subordinate) liabilities
Negative covenants
Underwriting and product standards
Collateral rules (minimum margin,
haircut)
Central clearing requirements
Exemptions and priorities
Bankruptcy safe harbors
Depositor preference
Short maturity
Collateral

Guaranteed Safe
Eligibility for LOLR
loans
Eligibility
for
extraordinary support
(institutions) 94
Central bank swap
lines
Affiliate guarantees
Third party guarantees
Insurance and other
credit enhancement

License to invest
Exemptions
from
concentration limits
Permitted investment
designation
High Quality Liquid
Asset designation
Asset risk weights
Regulatory accounting
Stable NAV
Credit ratings

Deposit insurance
Eligibility for central
bank
operations
(monetary
policy,
lender of last resort)
Eligibility
for
extraordinary support
95
(contracts)
Insurance and other
credit enhancement
Affiliate
support,
including bringing offbalance sheet claims
on balance sheet

The table is illustrative, not exhaustive. We try to capture a range of
statutory, regulatory, and contractual tools whose explicit objectives directly
implicate asset safety. For the remainder of Part II, we consider the three
categories of tools in turn. We explore overlaps, misalignments, and hidden
risks in Part III.
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This is consistent with the analysis of public and private safe assets in the economic literature in Part I,
supra.
94.
See, e.g., The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Financial Crisis and Actions To Foster
Maximum Employment and Price Stability, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm (last updated June 4, 2015).
95.
See, e.g., id.

38137 yar_33-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B

Labeled Safe
Charter, license
Primary
dealer
designation
Credit ratings
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A. Made Safe(r)
The state can reduce the risks associated with would-be safe assets in two
ways. First, it can promote “safe and sound” (solvent, liquid, and otherwise less
risky) firms capable of issuing liabilities that function as safe assets. Second, it
can reduce risks associated with particular contracts or categories of contracts
to support full and timely repayment, stable prices, and trading at par in
multiple states of the world—turning them into safe assets.
1. Issuers
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96.
We defer the discussion of deposit insurance until Part II.C. See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI &
MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT (2013); HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, REGULATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (1999); Robert C. Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1
(1976); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., A Two-Tiered System of Regulation Is Needed to Preserve the Viability
of Community Banks and Reduce the Risk of Megabanks, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 249 (2015).
97.
E.g., National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (limiting the activities of U.S. banks—albeit to a
surreally long list that reeks of political economy); Valentine V. Craig, Merchant Banking: Past and
Present,
FDIC
BANKING
REV.,
Fall
2011,
at
29
(2002),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2001sep/br2001v14n1.pdf
(explaining
historical
development of restrictions on commercial banks’ merchant banking activities); see infra Part III.B.2.
98.
See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 79 (proposing 100% cash reserve banking).
99.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-1-64 (1940); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(2) (2015) (allowing some money
market mutual funds to report their daily net asset value, that is, the total value of their securities
holdings divided by the number of shares outstanding, at a fixed price so long as the market value of
these securities does not deviate from the reported amount by more than a small amount). This is a
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Bank balance sheet regulation is the best-known example of making
institutions safer, which in turn makes it possible for them to issue minimally
risky liabilities to serve safe asset functions. Bank deposits function as safe
assets for people and firms. They are both a store of value and a payment
medium, available in full on demand. For a bank, deposits are senior liabilities
whose payoff depends on the quality of its assets, the cushion of junior
liabilities available to absorb losses, and the way in which the bank runs its
business. To protect demand deposits, laws and regulations prescribe the
composition of bank assets and junior liabilities; they also restrict bank
activities and affiliations.96 Balance sheet regulation is also prominent in the
regulation of other financial intermediaries, such as money market mutual
funds, as well as insurance underwriters and defined benefit plans.
On the asset side, regulation encourages some investments and restricts
others, to make all of the firm’s liabilities safer. For example, deposit-taking
banks may only hold enumerated assets and, within this set, are encouraged to
hold some over others.97 At the limit, scholars have argued that banks should
hold cash reserves equal to their deposit liabilities—which would make
deposits even more cash-like, save for operational risk.98 Money market mutual
funds in the United States must maintain the market value of their assets within
a very narrow range.99
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On the liability side, a senior-subordinated hierarchy protects senior debt
from default. Legislation secures the privileged status of bank deposits
(depositor preference) in a growing number of countries.100 Depositors are first
in line to be paid under these laws when a bank fails. At the bottom of the
hierarchy, capital adequacy regulations mandate a minimum cushion of residual
liabilities (capital), so that deposits are repaid in full even when bank assets
lose value.101
Structural measures can be used in addition to or in lieu of balance sheet
regulation, to help insulate firms that issue safe assets from risks elsewhere in
the financial system. Activities such as trading securities or dealing in
derivatives might be barred or severely curtailed, along with potentially risky
affiliations.102 Transactions with affiliates are also regulated partly out of
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condition of issuing shares valued at par and redeemable on demand, a defining feature of money market
mutual funds. Jill Fisch & Eric D. Roiter, A Floating NAV for Money Market Funds: Fix or Fantasy?,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003 (2012); see infra Part III.B.3.
100.
See, e.g., Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, 2013, c. 33, § 13 (U.K.); Council of
the Euro. Union, Council Agrees Position on Bank Resolution (June 27, 2013),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/137627.pdf (stating that
“[u]nder the Council’s general approach agreed today, eligible deposits from natural persons and micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as liabilities to the European Investment Bank, would have
preference over the claims of ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors and depositors from large
corporations”).
101.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 3, 5, 6, 208, 217, 225 (2015) (setting forth U.S. capital adequacy
regulations and Basel III implementation, including asset risk weights); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking
Systems (June 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
Basel III: Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements (Jan. 2014),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf. Liability tiering need not accompany asset-side regulation: money
market fund liabilities comprise mostly equity.
102.
These can either “ring-fence” traditional banking activities within a financial
conglomerate (the prevailing approach in the United Kingdom and continental Europe) or separate the
banking group from other parts of the financial system (as in the United States). See, e.g., Loi No. 2013672 du 26 Juillet 2013 de séparation et de régulation des activités bancaires [Law 2013-672 of July 26,
2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities]; Gesetz zur Abschirmung von Risiken und
zur Planung der Sanierung und Abwicklung von Kreditinstituten und Finanzgruppen [Law concerning
Separation of Risks and Restructuring and Winding-Up of Credit Institutions and Financial Groups],
Aug. 12, 2013, BGBl. I at 3090, § 2 (Ger.) (Trennbankengesetz [German Bank Separation Law] is
included in § 2); Liikanen et al., High-Level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU
Banking Sector (Oct. 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high
-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf; U.K. INDEP. COMM. ON BANKING, Final Report Recommendations
(Sept. 2011), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131003105424/https:/hmt
-sanctions.s3.amazonaws.com/ICB%20final%20report/ICB%2520Final%2520Report%5B1%5D.pdf;
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et al., Agencies Issue Final Rules Implementing the Volcker
Rule (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131210a; see José
Viñals et al., Creating a Safer Financial System: Will the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural
Measures
Help?,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND
(May
2013),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1304.pdf; Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian van Rixtel,
Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: Approaches and Implications, (BIS Working Papers No. 412,
2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/work412.pdf. Structural reform as a regulatory technique is not new; it
was used to insulate deposit-taking banks since the nineteenth century, and most prominently to separate
commercial banking from other financial activities in the Banking Act of 1933 (or the Glass-Steagall
Act) in the United States. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162. Structural separation is
also used to protect claims by contract and regulation outside banking, among other areas, in asset
securitization, Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 91, and investment fund regulation, John Morley, The
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concern that risk-taking within financial conglomerates might infect protected
firms.
2. Assets
Statutes and regulations prescribe contract terms, contracting practices,
and repayment priorities, and they shield some claims from impairment in
bankruptcy. They work alongside private law techniques to reduce risk in
contracts.
Margin and collateral requirements are assets-level analogues to minimum
capital in institutional regulation. Brokers, exchanges, and public authorities
have long required investors to make a minimum down payment (margin) when
buying a security with borrowed funds.103 Similarly, over-collateralization
(haircuts) is common in securities-based lending, such as repos.104 Post-2008
regulatory reform initiatives include minimum haircuts for contracts that do not
clear through central counterparties, and, more broadly, for all securities
financing transactions.105 Collateral requirements here enhance the probability
of full payoff, and encourage central clearing.
In a world where debt contracts serve as ingredients for multiple layers of
other debt contracts, some or all of which are designed to function as safe
assets, legal intervention can enhance safety at multiple contracting levels.
Underwriting standards for asset-backed securities represent intervention at the
repackaging level, but they are designed to reduce credit risk in the underlying
mortgage contracts.106 Criteria for debtors’ ability to repay, minimum loan-tovalue ratios, due diligence standards, and (less commonly) constraints on the
financial terms reduce the risk of default on consumer loans. Once the loans are
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Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation 123 YALE
L.J. 1228 (2014).
103.
GERDING, supra note 16, at 379.
104.
In a repo transaction, one party sells a security to another and agrees to buy it back for a
higher price at a future date. This is functionally equivalent to a loan by the buyer to the seller in the
amount of the sale price, with the security acting as collateral. The difference between the sale and
repurchase prices reflects implicit interest on the loan. The sale price is typically less than the market
price of the security; as a result, the loan is effectively over-collateralized at the outset. The amount of
over-collateralization, or the difference between the sale price and the market price of the security, is
referred to as a “haircut.” It is akin to debtor equity in the transaction. Buyers (lenders) demand a larger
haircut (more collateral) when they worry about the risk of repayment or a decline in collateral value.
GERDING, supra note 16, at 375; Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Money, Liquidity, and Monetary
Policy, 99 AMER. ECON. REV. 600, 602 (2009).
105.
FIN. STABILITY BD., Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking (2014),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141013a.pdf. Contracts secured by
government debt would be exempt. See also, Tarullo, supra note 17 (“[W]e will be developing a
regulation that would establish minimum haircuts for securities financing transactions (SFTs) on a
market-wide basis, rather than just for specific classes of market participants.”)
106.
Patricia A. McCoy & Elizabeth Renuart, The Legal Infrastructure of Subprime and
Nontraditional Home Mortgages, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV. (Feb. 2008),
http://jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/ucc08-5_mccoy_renuart.pdf.
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repackaged, these measures also support the performance of securitization
claims.107
Central clearing is a tool to mitigate counterparty risk in private financial
contracts. A central counterparty stands between two sides in a financial
contract, reducing the risk that one of them might fail without performing its
side of the bargain.108 In 2008, traders in derivatives and repo markets feared
that their contract counterparties might fail; their individual efforts to manage
the risk by demanding more collateral led to panic sales and more failures.109 In
response, world leaders agreed in 2009 to require previously unregulated
derivatives contracts to be cleared through central counterparties—regulated
institutions that mutualize counterparty risk—and have since advocated similar
reforms for repos.110
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107.
We do not suggest that consumer mortgages become safe assets for banks by virtue of
complying with consumer protection regulations. However, post-crisis reforms of mortgage
securitization expressly link consumer protection, mortgage underwriting standards, and the safety of
mortgage-backed securities, which have functioned as safe assets. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43. A mortgage
that meets the “qualified mortgage” requirements of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is
exempt from the risk retention requirement (skin in the game) for securitization under the Dodd-Frank
Act. See id. (defining “qualified mortgage”); Credit Risk Retention; Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg.
57,928, 57,989 (Sept. 20, 2013). Making asset-backed securities safe entails a mix of contract and
balance sheet regulation. Laws that require lenders to retain a portion of the credit risk when selling off
pools of loans try to promote more resilient cash flow structures and better monitoring. Covered bond
laws, which leave the original lenders responsible for the performance of their repackaged loans, are an
alternative approach to risk retention. Risk retention in securitization can resemble capital adequacy
requirements elsewhere. Contract and institutional measures combined seek to align the incentives for
safe asset engineers, issuers, investors, and parties to the underlying contracts. IMF GFSR, supra note 1,
at 88-89. For background on covered bonds, see Edward V. Murphy, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41322,
COVERED BONDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (Apr. 2013); STANDARD & POOR’S, Covered
Bonds—A
Primer
on
the
Top
Five
Global
Jurisdictions
(Mar.
14,
2011),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_EMEA/2011-0314_CoveredBondsAPrimerOntheTop5GlobalJurisdictions.pdf.
108.
A common objection to this requirement is that it replaces the risk of bilateral
counterparty failure with the risk of central counterparty failure. The rich debate over the merits of
central clearing is beyond the scope of this Article. We simply identify clearing requirements as an
example of state intervention to ensure payoff for particular contracts. See Adam J. Levitin, The Tenuous
Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, Prioritization and
Mutualization: Clearinghouses and the Redundancy of the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, 10 BROOK. J. OF
CORP., FIN., AND COMM. L. 129 (2015); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in
Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387 (2013). While clearinghouses are an old device, regulations
mandating that traders use them is new.
109.
See, e.g., Gorton & Metrick, supra note 79.
110.
Leaders’ Statement at the Pittsburgh Summit, G20 9 (Sept. 24-25, 2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7g20/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf (leaders’ agreement on derivatives
clearing). Regulators have also advocated central clearing for repos in domestic and international fora;
however, they have stopped short of mandating it by law, and have relied instead on moral suasion.
COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., Strengthening Repo Clearing and Settlement Arrangements
(2010), http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d91.pdf; Liz McCormick, Financial Firms Move Closer to
Central Clearing in Repo Market, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2015, 1:18 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-13/financial-firms-move-closer-to-central-clearing
-in-repo-market. The United States and other jurisdictions have since implemented the derivatives
reforms. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, tit. VII, sec. 761-774, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 1774-1802 (2010); FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC Derivatives Market Reforms:
Eighth Progress Report on Implementation (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp
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Bankruptcy priorities support payoff for senior debt even when the issuer
is insolvent. Claims with absolute priority in liquidation are paid in full before
those behind them get anything.111 Priorities minimize credit, but not liquidity
risk, since senior claims can be tied up in insolvency proceedings for a long
time.112
Aptly named “safe harbors” in bankruptcy offer even stronger protections
for eligible contracts. Unlike priorities, safe harbors address both credit and
liquidity risks. In the United States, safe harbored contracts such as repos and
derivatives escape automatic stay on creditor enforcement, rules against setoff,
and against preferential transfers to creditors.113 They are “effectively exempt
from bankruptcy.”114 For example, while other secured creditors must petition
the court to sell their collateral, repo lenders can sell it immediately. Unlike
other creditors, they can also accelerate and terminate their contracts.115 For
repos, special treatment is justified expressly by the need to keep this vital
funding market safe and liquid.116
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-content/uploads/r_141107.pdf.
111.
11 U.S.C. § 507; see also id. § 1129(b) (providing that, in general, if a class of unsecured
creditors rejects a debtor’s reorganization plan and is not paid in full, junior creditors and equity interest
holders may not receive or retain any property under the plan).
112.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507 (listing claims in order of priority); id. § 364 (providing that a
party who provides post-petition financing to a debtor may negotiate a “superpriority”); see also
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (involving a prolonged adversary proceeding to determine
validity and extent of note and trust deed held on debtors’ real property); Morrison et al., supra note 16,
at 8. The example of depositor preference illustrates how repayment priority fits in the range of
interventions to make assets safe. In the first instance, balance sheet regulation is supposed to prevent
default. Central banks backstop balance sheet regulation with liquidity support; deposit insurance pays
out when the bank must be closed. Depositor preference comes into play if deposit insurance is not
enough. Daniel C. Hardy, Bank Resolution Costs, Depositor Preference and Asset Encumbrance, 22 J.
FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 96 (2014).
113.
Morrison et al., supra note 15, at 1022.
114.
For a review of arguments for and against safe harbors for various financial contracts, see
DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 135 (2011); Stephen J. Lubben, Transaction Simplicity, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 194 (2012); Ondersma, supra note 79, at 17-27. For repos, see Morrison et al., supra note
15, at 1032-38.
115.
In bilateral repos, sellers (borrowers) and buyers (lenders) deal with each other directly.
In triparty repos, agents intermediate between them, stand ready to substitute collateral, and, in some
cases, to provide intraday financing. As of January 2014, the U.S. repo market stood at just over $3
trillion, with tri-party and bilateral repos each representing approximately $1.4 trillion. In the U.S.
market, most bilateral repos use U.S. Treasury debt as collateral; most tri-party repos use other assets.
See Morrison et al., supra note 15, at 1020, 1025-26.
116.
See Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institutions Insolvencies;
Treatment of Derivatives Before the Subcomm. on Reg. Reform, Com. and Antitrust L. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 31 (Mar. 26, 2014) (testimony of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/113
-90_87331.pdf. But see id. at 9 (testimony of Hon. Christopher S. Sontchi, Judge, U.S. Bankr. Ct., D.
Del.).
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3. Made Safe(r): Conclusions
Legal and regulatory intervention can make assets less risky. It directs the
composition of firm balance sheets and restricts their activities and affiliations,
so that they may issue safe assets. It mandates contract terms and contracting
procedures in an effort to turn financial contracts into safe assets. Statutes and
regulations may even insulate debt contracts from the debtor’s insolvency.
Reducing the risks associated with particular assets can follow two
distinct approaches. The first seeks to reduce risk-taking in the financial system
as a whole, as in the case of bank activity and affiliation restrictions. The
second—inherent in any senior-subordinate structure, as well as in bankruptcy
safe harbors and priorities—seeks to redistribute risk, making some claims
safer at the expense of making others riskier, requiring them to absorb losses
that would have been broadly distributed otherwise.
Making assets safer usually entails incremental moves to reduce particular
risks. Multiple forms of intervention can operate simultaneously on the asset
and its issuer, dialing safety precautions up or down. None tell buyers to treat
the asset as if it were risk-free.117 Labels are different.
B. Labeled Safe

1. Label as License
Chartering rules for safe asset issuers are the simplest form of labeling.
For example, a firm cannot simply call itself a bank and start selling demand
liabilities to the public. Formal barriers to entry and continuing oversight
requirements that go with the ability to issue safe assets fill many volumes of
legal code and scholarship.118 Contemporary proposals to regulate shadow
banking piggyback on existing licensing schemes.119
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117.
We address the possibility that intervention to “make safe” would convey incidental
labels infra in Part III.
118.
For an elementary overview of bank chartering requirements in the United States, see
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FAQ: How Can I Start a Bank?
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12779.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2016).
119.
See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 14, GORTON, supra note 72 (proposing bank-like licensing
schemes for issuers of short-term claims).
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We use the shorthand “labels” for authoritative public statements about
the riskiness of particular assets. Two kinds of labels are prominent in safe
asset construction: label-as-license and label-as-price. Label-as-license permits
regulated firms to issue liabilities that are treated as safe assets by the public;
labels also attach to assets, and operate as permissions for regulated firms to
buy assets that would otherwise be off-limits to them. Label-as-price can
determine the cost of different investments for regulated firms, or the quoted
value of their liabilities.
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On the asset side of regulated firms, labels such as “permitted
investments” denote financial contracts that regulators deem to be “safe
enough” for those firms. The label works as a license to invest. Some
regulations specify permitted investments by name, as, for example, in U.S.
federal bank regulations and the “legal lists” of bank investments published by
U.S. states, which practically entrench the safe status of specific contracts.120
Others describe asset attributes. For instance, some state laws limit banks,
municipalities and insurance firms to investments with stable net asset value
(NAV).121 Exemptions operate as versions of licensing: U.S. government debt
is exempt from prohibitions on affiliate transactions and proprietary trading
under U.S. banking law.122 European government debt is exempt from
concentration limits under EU bank regulations.123
Licensing operates as an on-off switch, potentially creating a market for
an asset where there was none. It can also work as a railroad switch, redirecting
large-scale financial flows from one sector or region to another. People fight
over labels for decades because a lot rides on them. The history of bank
regulation in the United States is a string of battles over permitted investments
and activities, waged between commercial banks and their competitors in and
outside the financial sector.124
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120.
See, e.g., supra note 97; MASS. COMM. OF BANKS, List of Legal Investments,
http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/banking-and-finance/banking-services/list-of-legal-investments.html
(last
updated July 2015) (listing investment deemed “legal” under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 167
section 15A); see also W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR
EXPERIENCE 211-77 (1957) (commenting on the performance of bonds on “Legal Lists.”).
121.
INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 27-28 & app. D
(2009), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (“Many state laws and regulations also authorize
municipalities, insurance companies, and other state regulated entities to invest in stable NAV funds,
sometimes explicitly including funds operating in compliance with Rule 2a-7. Thus, absent a stable
NAV, many state and local governments no longer would be able to use money market funds to help
manage their cash.”); Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reform: Hearing Before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 31-32 (June 21, 2012)
(testimony of Paul Schott Stevens, CEO, Investment Company Institute).
122.
The proprietary trading exemption also applies to some non-U.S. government debt under
a limited set of circumstances. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests
in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536 (Jan. 2014) (to
be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1851).
123.
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Art. 400(2)(g)
& (h), 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1; Bank of England, Large exposures, Supervisory Statement SS16/13, § 4
(Dec. 2013).
124.
HELEN GARTEN, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION & THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD (2001)
(describing the history of U.S. regulatory approaches to competition among banks and securities firms);
Larry R. Mote, Banks and the Securities Market: The Controversy, 3 ECON. PERSPECTIVES, at 4 (Mar.
12, 1979), https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-perspectives/1979/mar-apr-mote-3. The
securities turf wars look quaint by comparison with more recent ones over derivatives, commodities, and
proprietary trading, each with its own constellation of vested interests. On derivatives and commodities,
see, for example, Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce &
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2012); Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How
Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) [hereinafter
Omarova, Quiet]. On proprietary trading, see, for example, Ian Talley, Could Volcker Rule Be a
‘Stealthier’ Way to Cut U.S. Debt?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/12/26/could-volker-rule-be-a-stealthier-way-to-cut-u-s-debt;
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When applied to assets, label-as-license does not call them risk-free, only
safe enough to buy. By extension, it does not dispense with the need for
regulated buyers to research the risk attributes of an asset. It just gets them over
a regulatory threshold. Although labels might help market participants limit
information-gathering costs, their stated purpose is to keep vulnerable firms
away from the riskiest of investments.125 Applied to firms, label-as-license
comes closer to calling their liabilities safe and actively dissuading the public
from acquiring private information about them.126 We explore this point further
in our discussion of money market mutual fund liabilities in the next section.
The distribution stakes in labels are on display in the protracted
controversy over liquidity standards for big banks and certain other
systemically important financial institutions. Following international
agreement,127 U.S. regulators mandated a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) for
such firms as a buffer against sudden cash outflows of the sort that led to
bailouts in 2008.128 Only High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) with minimal
credit risk and proven market liquidity are eligible for inclusion in LCR. The
HQLA label in the draft and final rule covered U.S. federal and certain foreign
government debt, but not state and municipal debt.129 Comment letters
threatened dire consequences for states and municipalities; one from a state
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Cheyenne Hopkins, U.S. Regulators Weight Volcker Rule Exemption for Sovereign Debt, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 1, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-01/u-s-regulators-weighvolcker-exemption-for-sovereign-debt (describing lobbying by top foreign officials to exempt their
government debt from proprietary trading restrictions of the Volcker Rule under the Dodd-Frank Act).
125.
The functions of label-as-license are analogous to those of gatekeepers in securities
markets. Rating agencies, accounting firms, investment banks, law firms, and others can serve as
“reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors.” John C.
Coffee, Jr. Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1405
(2002); see also Choi, supra note 91, at 918. Gatekeepers can also restrict market access. Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: the Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53,
53 (1986) (referring to gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). See also, Holmstrom, supra notes 41 and 48,
discussing Morris and Shin, supra note 48, on the utility of “coarse” ratings that convey only
approximate information about risk and change infrequently for coordinating market participants
perceptions of risk.
126.
Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton, Bengt Holmstrom & Guillermo Ordonez, Banks as Secret
Keepers, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20255, 2014),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20255.
127.
BASEL COMM. ON BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 89, at 7.
128.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring;
Proposed Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,818, 71,868 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§
50, 249 & 329), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-29/pdf/2013-27082.pdf; Liquidity Coverage
Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards; Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,440, 61,541 (Oct. 10, 2014)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §. 50, 249, & 329), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-10-10/pdf/2014
-22520.pdf. Europe is also in the process of implementing the liquidity coverage ratio. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Comfort, Basel IV is the Buzzword as Europe’s Banks Brace for Costs, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 6,
2015 11:29 A.M.), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-06/basel-iv-is-the-buzzword-as
-europe-s-big-banks-brace-for-costs (noting that the liquidity coverage ratio is expected to be
implemented in the E.U. by 2019).
129.
U.S. LCR regulations, supra note 128.
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treasurer implied that federal regulators favored Botswana over California.130
The authorities relented in May 2015, and offered to include some municipal
debt in HQLA, only to face more pressure to include the rest.131
2. Label as Price
Regulatory labels can function as price tags attached to the assets and
liabilities of regulated firms. For example, a bank’s assets are “weighted,” or
adjusted for risk, to determine the minimum level of capital it must hold to
protect against unexpected loss.132 If a corporate loan is weighted at 100% and
a residential mortgage loan in the same amount is weighted at 50%, the first
loan takes twice as much minimum capital as the second. Assets risk-weighted
at zero, including bonds issued by some governments and international
institutions, take no capital at all.133 To the extent a bank pays more to issue
capital compared to other liabilities,134 it pays more to hold assets with higher
risk weights. It is discouraged but not barred from buying such assets—and
encouraged to herd into others with lower risk weights. Risk weights, like
licenses, can also convey government assessments of risk.
Asset risk weights purport to recognize the attributes of an asset, but not
alter them. This is not strictly accurate. Risk weights can be sharply
discontinuous and static in a way that risk is not. For example, for much of the
history of international capital adequacy regulation, governments had agreed on
a “bucket” approach to risk—an approach that still substantially governs bank
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130.
Letter from Bill Lockyer, Treasurer, State of California (Jan. 31, 2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/February/20140221/R-1466/R1466_022114_112029_567028751783_1.pdf. The letter from California is notable in light of the state’s
persistent fiscal crises and the fact that most of the foreign government securities listed in the letter
would not in fact qualify for inclusion in LCR. See, e.g., Stephanie Simon, Cash-strapped California’s
IOUs:
Just
the
Latest
Sub
for
Dollars,
WALL. ST. J.
(Jul.
25,
2009),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124846739587579877 (discussing California’s decision to issue scrip in
a 2009 financial crisis).
131.
Regulation WW: Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Treatment of Municipal Securities as HighQuality
Liquid
Assets,
B D.
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R-1514&doc_ver=1 (last visited
Aug. 28, 2015).
132.
We described regulatory capital earlier as a mandatory cushion of residual liabilities first
in line to absorb losses when assets fail to pay as expected. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Governments have coordinated their approaches to capital adequacy regulations, including risk weights,
since the 1980s under the auspices of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The scope of
coordination has broadened since 2008. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A Brief History of
the Basel Committee (Oct. 2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
133.
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards (1988), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf.
134.
The magnitude of the effect and explanations for it are subject to debate. Compare
ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 96 (arguing that minimum capital requirements of 25 percent would
not entail higher costs for banks) with INST. OF INT’L FIN., Risk Sensitivity: The Important Role of
Internal Models (Oct. 2014), https://www.iif.com/publication/regulatory-report/risk-sensitivityimportant-role-internal-models (arguing that higher capital would entail substantial cost and risk).
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capital in the United States.135 They divided bank assets into four credit risk
categories, corresponding to zero, 20%, 50% and 100% risk weights depending
on the nature of the issuer and the contract. Assets would not normally move
between buckets.136 Static labels might be good at herding investors and easier
to monitor. However, the risk assessments they convey are crude at best.137
Regulatory accounting rules applied to the liabilities of safe asset issuers
can also serve as price tags directed at potential buyers. For example, as already
noted, U.S. securities regulations have long permitted money market mutual
funds to quote their shares at a stable net asset value (NAV), typically $1 per
share, provided the fluctuating market value of their asset portfolios (shadow
NAV) stayed close to the quoted value.138 Stable NAV allows buyers of money
market fund shares to treat them as if they guaranteed repayment at par; it
makes them more “money-like.”139
A fixed regulatory value, such as $1 per share for money market mutual
funds, comes closest to declaring an asset to be safe. The $1 label tells investors
that there would be no deviation in payoff. In contrast, while zero-risk
weighting in capital adequacy regulations might imply total safety, on its face,
it only tells regulated investors that they need not hold regulatory capital
against the asset.
3. Labeled Safe: Conclusions
Labels tell potential buyers that an asset is safe, or at least safe enough for
their purposes. They can deter market-based information discovery, promote
information insensitivity, and boost the liquidity of labeled assets. Unlike the
tools we surveyed in Part I.A, labels do not make the issuer of labeled assets
more creditworthy or payoff more certain.
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135.
Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Regulatory Capital
Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions,
Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and
Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital
Rule,” 78 Fed. Reg. 62,018 (Oct. 11, 2015) (to be codified at 12 CFR pts. 3, 5, 6, 165, 167, 208 and
225).
136.
Discontinuity has diminished as standards evolved, for example, to permit limited use of
internal risk models by the largest internationally active banks; however, it never disappeared altogether.
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 133. U.S. capital adequacy regulations
implementing the latest revision of the Basel Accords set a minimum capital floor using a bucket-based
standardized approach, even for firms that are otherwise eligible to use internal models. Supra note 135
(U.S. capital adequacy regulations).
137.
Compare to the discussion of “coarse” ratings in Holmstrom, supra note 41, citing Morris
and Shin, supra note 48.
138.
The use of stable NAV was limited, but not eliminated, in post-crisis regulatory reform.
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7; Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47736
(Aug. 14, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 239, 270, 274, 279).
139.
See, e.g., Greenwood et al., supra note 54, at 4-5; Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgenson,
supra note 63, at 234; supra Part I.B. Some sophisticated institutional investors derive additional
regulatory and accounting benefits from holding fund shares with stable accounting value; this
resembles the label-as-license effect. INV. CO. INST., supra note 121, at 1-2.
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Stark, discontinuous labels are best at coordinating potential asset buyers.
They may also facilitate public oversight, since regulated firms would herd into
a limited menu of licensed assets. “Zero-risk” and “$1 per share” labels
illustrate: they are transparent, administrable, and make better focal points for
investors than labels reflecting fine risk gradations. They promote herding into
assets labeled safe, but can also prompt runs and crashes when taken away. 140
More than any other mode of intervention, labels traffic in fictions.141
They can authoritatively deem an asset category to be safe, not just a bit safer,
and instruct regulated firms to act on the label in lieu of an independent risk
assessment. Labels can save investors some of the cost of risk assessment if
regulators have superior information or can do a better job evaluating risk. This
is a big “if.” Public authorities do not have an information advantage with
respect to financial assets in general, apart from their own debt and claims
issued by the firms they regulate. Information advantage cannot fully explain
why market participants would embrace public labels. Labels may make sense
as tools to promote “symmetrical ignorance” in the trading of informationinsensitive debt—but they can also be interpreted as representations of safety,
or commitments to safety by the public authorities. Because market participants
tend to adapt safe assets for multiple functions, it would be difficult to constrain
the use of a labeled asset to the original narrow purpose of the label.142
C. Guaranteed Safe

1. Credit Guarantees
Credit guarantees commit fiscal resources to the safety of private
contracts. Full and unconditional credit guarantees turn private contracts into
government debt. They can encourage excessive risk-taking by absolving
private actors of the consequences. At the other extreme, partial and conditional
guarantees do little for asset safety, because potential beneficiaries of the
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140.
See, e.g, Steinar Holden et al., An Equilibrium Model of Credit Rating Agencies (Norges
Bank
Res.
Working
Paper
No,
2012-23,
2012),
http://www.norgesbank.no/pages/92250/Norges_Bank_Working_Paper_2012_23.pdf (modeling rating agencies as solving
coordination problems among investors).
141.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing and applying the concept of legal
fiction).
142.
See Table 1 and note 51, supra, and the accompanying text, elaborating multiple
functions of safe assets and the concept of information-insensitive debt.
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A government does have superior tools to ensure the safety of any given
contract: it can adopt the contract as its own. Public backing for safe assets can
take the form of credit and liquidity guarantees. It may be explicit or implicit,
direct or indirect, ex ante or ex post. The law sets the terms of the explicit
guarantees and creates the space for the implicit ones. We describe the key
permutations below.
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guarantee have no assurance of full payment. The ubiquitous pejorative
“bailouts” describes ex post public rescues whose terms are not spelled out in
advance. A bailout does shape expectations of future guarantees. In practice,
unconditional guarantees of safe assets are rare. However, conditions specified
in ordinary times rarely hold up in a systemic crisis.
Bank deposit insurance is a widely known and relatively transparent credit
guarantee, usually elaborated in statutes and regulations.143 Although it attaches
to deposits, insurance also supports the bank itself by dissuading depositors
from running. While statutory guarantees make deposits “default-free” in the
eyes of the public, they are rarely unconditional or full.144 Caps, co-insurance,
and insurance payout delays qualify the safety of deposits for depositors. For
banks owners and creditors, the availability of insurance may depend in part on
compliance with solvency and business conduct regulations, among other
conditions.145 In some cases, public funds may not be paid until after some
combination of equity, junior debt, affiliate contributions, and industry
financing is exhausted.146 Insurance schemes try to get as close as possible to
cash-like safety for the depositors without subsidizing other bank creditors.
Government commitments to pay no more and no less than promised fail
in two situations. First, governments extend coverage to more claims and
claimants in crisis, out of concern for system-wide spillovers. Both the United
Kingdom and the United States did so in 2007-2008.147 Second, governments
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143.
On deposits as safe assets, see supra Part II.A.1; Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane,
Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 2002 at
175; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt et al., Deposit Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Database,
(World Bank Pol’y Res. Working Paper no. 3628 2005); FIN. STABILITY BD., Thematic Review on
Deposit
Insurance
Systems
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120208.pdf.
144.
See Ricks, supra note 80, at 1290. In most cases, deposit insurance is capped to limit the
benefit to small retail depositors who cannot protect themselves. In some cases, depositors are required
to absorb a small portion of the losses. Deposits can become illiquid if insurance does not pay out
immediately—this is a particular risk for insurance schemes that are not pre-funded. For an analysis of
pre-funded and post-funded models, see Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit
Insurance: Theory and Practice, in 5 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL AND MONETARY LAW
417 (International Monetary Fund, 2008). A combination of these factors made depositors in Northern
Rock bank in the U.K. lose confidence in the safety of their deposits in September 2007. See H. OF
COMMONS,
TREASURY
COMM.
The
Run
on
the
Rock
(Jan.
24,
2008),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmtreasy/56/56i.pdf.
145.
In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation uses a distinct set of
criteria for insurance termination, which only partly overlap with the broader regulatory regime. 12
U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2), (w).
146.
See, e.g., Jianping Zhou et al., From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring
of
Systemic
Financial
Institutions,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND
(April
2012),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1203.pdf; see also Resolution of Systemically
Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 243 (Dec. 2013).
Deposit insurance can justify intrusive regulation in light of moral hazard concerns. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1811-1835a (2015).
147.
See, for example, Jean Eaglesham et al., UK to Guarantee Northern Rock Deposits, FIN.
TIMES (September 17, 2007 6:57 pm), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/39199b78-6489-11dc-90ea
-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3CsFh6xOo. For the terms of U.K. deposit insurance, before the crisis, see
Deposit Limits, FIN. SERVS. COMP. SCHEME, http://www.fscs.org.uk/what-we-cover/eligibility
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run out of resources or political capacity to honor the original guarantee and
curtail coverage (or choose among the claimants) in crisis. When it became
apparent that Iceland’s deposit insurance scheme was bankrupt in 2008, Iceland
paid its own nationals ahead of U.K. and Dutch depositors in Icelandic
banks.148
Bailouts reveal and deliver on implicit credit guarantees. The usual
beneficiaries are national champions, too-big-to-fail financial firms, political
subdivisions, and other entities whose failure would be macroeconomically or
politically intolerable.149 Implicit guarantees may be widely recognized ex ante,
as in the case of U.S. housing finance Agencies, or GSEs.150 Investors
accurately predicted that the economic and political significance of the housing
finance agencies in the U.S. economy, U.S. and global financial markets would
make their failure inconceivable. In other cases, expectations of guarantees are
attenuated before the crisis, but might become entrenched after the bailouts
materialize.151 Fear of moral hazard prompts new ex ante limits on bailout
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-rules/compensation-limits/deposit-limits (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“For claims against firms declared
in default before 1 October 2007, the maximum level of compensation is £31,700 (100% of the first
£2,000 and 90% of the next £33,000).”). See also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., Temporary Liquidity
Guarantee Program, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/tlgp/ (last updated Feb. 27, 2013) (“On
October 14, 2008, . . . the FDIC implemented the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP). . . .
The TLGP guaranteed in full all domestic noninterest-bearing transaction deposits, low-interest NOW
accounts, and Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs) held at participating banks and thrifts
through December 31, 2009.”); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051
(2009) (describing blanket ex post bank guarantees in the U.K. and Korea).
148.
The risk is especially high in countries whose banking system is many times the size of
the economy (Iceland’s was nine times the size). The European Free Trade Area court upheld Iceland’s
decision. EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, EFTA Court Case E-16/11 (2013) (stating that in
October 2008, U.K. and Netherlands depositors of Landesbanki, an Icelandic bank, lost access to their
deposits).
149.
Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 453-54 (2011).
150.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of GSE debt; e.g., David Reiss,
The Federal Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle
Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2008). Agency debt was used by reserve and asset
managers around the world as a stand-in for U.S. Treasury debt long before federal backing was made
explicit in the summer of 2008, followed by government takeover. See WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC
LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34314, CHINA’S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 7 (2013) (observing that Agency securities had accounted for more than 40% of
China’s overall holdings of U.S. securities before the crisis, but have since dropped substantially); N.
ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22916, FANNIE MAE’S AND FREDDIE MAC’S FINANCIAL
PROBLEMS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2008) (“The GSEs have a special relationship with the
federal government—sometimes called an implicit guarantee—that has allowed them to borrow at
interest rates only slightly above those paid by the federal government”); N. ERIC WEISS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40800, GSES AND THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN HOUSING FINANCE: ISSUES FOR THE
113TH CONGRESS 2-4 (2013) (describing Agency conservatorship arrangements, including solvency
guarantees from the U.S. Treasury).
151.
See, e.g., Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 1, at 48 (describing the consequences of
federal rescue of commercial paper market); Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, Implicit
Guarantees and Risk Taking: Evidence from Money Market Funds (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17321, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17321 (evaluating risk-taking after
unexpected implicit federal guarantee was made explicit); see also FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS,
Special
Studies
–
Too
Big
To
Fail,
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/studies/tbtf (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (debating
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authority, even as fresh memories of bailouts detract from the credibility of
such limits.152
2. Liquidity Guarantees
If market participants could replace an asset at face value with central
bank money at any time, they would have strong justification for using that
asset as if it were risk-free. Central banks have multiple ways to make it
happen. They can buy and sell assets as part of monetary policy operations.153
They can make emergency loans to support solvent financial firms, and
increasingly, asset markets. In theory, these interventions are distinct from
credit guarantees, which remain the province of fiscal authorities. The trouble
is that the line between liquidity and credit support—which tends to mark the
boundary of central banks’ legal and political mandates—is fuzzy.154
The fuzziness follows from the mechanics of monetary policy and Lender
of Last Resort (LOLR) operations. For example, under normal conditions, an
independent central bank targeting prices across the economy, might buy and
sell short-term government bonds in the secondary market, and quickly reverse
the transactions. It typically tries to avoid influencing particular asset prices and
holding a large stock of securities on its balance sheet.155 In crisis, the same
central bank might react to acute distress in discrete market segments or
particular institutions. In a prolonged downturn, it might publicly commit to
buy specific securities in large quantities and hold them for a long time, to
induce a durable change in market and popular sentiment.156 As a result, the
central bank effectively guarantees the liquidity and boosts the price of specific
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the magnitude of the implicit subsidy for “Too Big to Fail” institutions before and after the financial
crisis beginning in 2007).
152.
See FIN. STABILITY BD., ADEQUACY OF LOSS-ABSORBING CAPACITY OF GLOBAL
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS IN RESOLUTION (2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp
-content/uploads/TLAC-Condoc-6-Nov-2014-FINAL.pdf; Allen Mattich, Can You Really End ‘Too Big
S T.
J.
MONEYBEAT
(Nov.
10,
2014,
1:03
P.M.),
To
Fail’?,
WALL
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/11/10/can-you-really-end-too-big-to-fail; see Arthur E. Wilmarth,
Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR.
L. REV. 951 (2011).
153.
The range of assets used for this purpose has expanded as central banks have resorted to
unconventional monetary policies in the face of low growth and zero interest rates.
154.
We have addressed this point elsewhere. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 147.
155.
See, e.g., Stephen G. Cecchetti & Piti Disyatat, Central Bank Tools & Liquidity
Shortages,
F.R.B.N.Y.
ECON.
POL’Y
REV.
33,
36
(Aug.
2010),
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/10v16n1/1008cecc.pdf.
156.
On unconventional asset purchase (quantitative easing) programs in the United States and
the United Kingdom, see, for example, Jack Meaning & Feng Zhu, The Impact of Recent Central Bank
Asset Purchase Programmes, BIS QUARTERLY REV., Dec. 2011, at 73 (2011),
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1112h.pdf. On quantitative easing in the euro area, see Asset
Purchase
Programmes,
EUR.
CENTRAL
BANK,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html (last updated Aug. 21, 2015); see
also Gregory Claeys et al., European Central Bank Quantitative Easing: The Detailed Manual,
BRUEGEL (Mar. 11, 2015), http://bruegel.org/2015/03/european-central-bank-quantitative-easing-the
-detailed-manual.
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assets eligible for its extraordinary operations.157 Its counterparties (primary
dealers) also benefit from the commitment to replace their securities with cash.
Central banks take on credit risk and face political backlash.158
Extraordinary measures by the European Central Bank (ECB) in response
to the euro area financial crisis illustrate the monetary policy dilemma. As the
Greek debt crisis intensified and threatened to spread across Europe in 2010,
the ECB announced measures to buy government bonds in those countries
hardest hit by the crisis. It then lent to banks at longer maturities against an
expanding range of collateral.159 While the ECB’s stated goal was to overcome
failures in monetary policy transmission, distressed governments received
important collateral benefits: lower borrowing costs and a ready buyer for their
debt. Critics accused the ECB of violating treaty prohibitions on bailouts of
member states (monetary financing).160 Accusations came from another
direction in 2015, when the ECB curtailed lending to Greek banks against
Greek government bonds as collateral: it was blamed for precipitating a
political crisis.161
The U.S. Federal Reserve came under criticism for stretching its LOLR
mandate and extending government guarantees to more assets and
institutions.162 In 2008, it adapted legal authority dormant since the Great
Depression to replace billions of dollars in private debt issued by banks,

C M
Y K

11/18/2016 10:27:53

403

38137 yar_33-2 Sheet No. 48 Side A

157.
See, e.g., Meaning & Zhu, supra note 156, at 74.
158.
Cecchetti & Disyatat, supra note 155, at 34 (discussing credit risk).
159.
The ECB conducts a unified monetary policy to achieve stable prices across the euro
area, so that a euro in booming Germany has the same value as a euro in deeply depressed Greece. This
is difficult to achieve when the interest rate on Greek government bonds is several times the rate on its
German counterparts. ECB tools include open market operations (buying and selling financial assets),
secured lending to banks, and requiring banks to hold funds on reserve with it. Government bonds are an
important channel for price transmission because (1) the cost of borrowing for other actors in the
economy is based on the interest rate on government bonds, (2) a big drop in the value of government
bonds can impair the balance sheets of banks and other important institutions that hold them, and (3) an
illiquid government bond market can reduce the availability of collateral for other financial transactions.
This can lead to less lending, higher interest rates, and economic contraction in the country whose
government bond markets have seized up. See Financial Markets in Early August 2011 and the ECB’S
Monetary
Policy
Measures,
ECB
BULL.,
Sept.
2011,
at
53,
MONTHLY
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/box5_mb201109en.pdf.
160.
See, e.g., H.W. Sinn, Responsibility of States and Central Banks in the Euro Crisis:
Expert report commissioned by the German Constitutional Court, Second Senate Constitutional
complaints 2 BvR 1390/12, 2 BvR 1439/12 and 2 BvR 1824/12 Organstreitverfahren (proceedings
related to a dispute between supreme federal bodies) 2 BvE 6/12 (Ger.) (Mar. 2014),
https://berlinoeconomicus.diw.de/geldpolitik/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2014/09/Stellungnahme_HWSinn_en.pdf (challenging crisis interventions by the
ECB and other European institutions); see also Claire Jones & Stefan Wagstyl, Mario Draghi
Vindicated as Court Backs ECB Bond-Buying Plan, FIN. TIMES (June 16, 2015),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c200c62e-1402-11e5-9bc5-00144feabdc0.html (reporting on a legal
challenge to the ECB’s €1.1tn quantitative easing program, and the court decision upholding it).
161.
Claire Jones & Ferdinando Giugliano, ECB Split Points to Sensitivity of Greek Liquidity
Curbs, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f36e752-ad5d-11e4-97c1
-00144feab7de.html (reporting criticism of the ECB’s curbs on the use of Greek government debt as
collateral).
162.
Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 457-60, 469 (Fed. Cl. 2015).
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securities dealers, and money market mutual funds, as well as repos, mortgagebacked securities, and commercial paper163 with public safe assets (money and
government debt). Such aggressive intervention is a far cry from nineteenth
century conceptions of LOLR, which stem panic by lending to already-solvent
commercial banks against already-good collateral.164 In theory, a LOLR does
not make banks solvent or collateral safe. In practice, modern central banks
have found themselves guaranteeing banks, non-banks, and asset markets, and
lending against collateral of variable quality and uncertain value.165 However,
ex post guarantees can prompt a political backlash once the crisis is contained,
usually on moral hazard grounds; in the United States, such backlash has
resulted in legislative limits on the Federal Reserve’s lending authority.166
3. Guaranteed Safe: Conclusions
The examples cited in this section and throughout this Article suggest that
laws and regulations specifically authorizing guarantees are poor predictors of
government intervention in crisis. With the partial exception of retail deposit
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163.
Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm (last visited Aug.
29, 2015); Michael J. Fleming, Federal Reserve Liquidity Provision during the Financial Crisis of 20072009
(Fed.
Reserve
Bank
of
N.Y.,
Staff
Reports
No.
563,
2012),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr563.pdf; Christian A. Johnson, Exigent and
Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis, in LAW REFORM AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 269 (Kern Alexander & Niamh Moloney eds. 2012) (describing Federal Reserve
liquidity facilities). For statutory authority for this activity, see 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (showing the
authority before the Dodd-Frank Act); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. XI, sec. 1101, 124 Stat 1376, 2113-15 (2010) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 343);
Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 79 Fed. Reg. 615 (Jan. 6, 2014) (proposing rules under
the amended 12 U.S.C. § 343); American International Group (AIG), Maiden Lane II and III, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_aig.htm
(last update Aug. 2, 2013); Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm (last
updated Aug. 2, 2013). For an academic analysis of the Fed’s use of emergency powers, see e.g., PETER
CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 95-96 (2016). In a letter to
the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury expressly assumed the credit risk associated with non-traditional
assets bought by the Federal Reserve as part of the emergency programs. See Donald L. Kohn, Vice
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada
(May 13, 2010), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20100513a.htm.
164.
WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (1873).
In theory, LOLR prevents a solvent bank from failing in a generalized panic, in contrast to deposit
insurance, which compensates depositors after their bank has failed. See supra notes 79 (runs) & 143
(deposit
insurance);
ELA
Procedures,
EURO.
CENTRAL
BANK
EUROSYSTEM,
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/201402_elaprocedures.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2016)
(explaining that the ECB does not have LOLR authority, which remains with national central banks. As
a result, its emergency response has been framed in monetary policy, not LOLR terms.) A LOLR cannot
guarantee the liquidity of assets denominated in a currency it does not issue.
165.
See, e.g., PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE
DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2010); Stephen G. Cecchetti & Piti Disyatat, Central Bank Tools and
Liquidity Shortages, 16 ECON. POL. REV. 29 (2010); Hiroshi Nakaso, The Financial Crisis in Japan
During the 1990s: How the Bank of Japan Responded and the Lessons Learnt, BANK OF INT’L
SETTLEMENTS (OCT. 2001), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap06.pdf.
166.
See sources cited supra note 163 (discussing amendments to 12 U.S.C. § 343).
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insurance (guarantees that visibly benefit consumers with premia charged to
banks), large-scale commitments of fiscal resources and central bank liquidity
to support safe assets in recent financial crises have been based on obscure,
open-ended, or creatively adapted authorities. Here the law may not always
shape buyers’ bailout expectations ex ante—except to the extent that a bailout
expressly or implicitly ratified by recourse to legal authority might create
expectations of more to come. The law supplies an ex post safety valve,
structuring and legitimating state intervention to bridge the gap between asset
risk attributes and their use by market participants. Such use, in turn, is shaped
by public and private labels embedded in laws, regulations, contracts, and
institutional practices.
Many of the beneficiary assets—including commercial paper, money
market mutual funds, repos, and asset-backed securities—had been labeled as
safe or singled out for special treatment (other than guarantees) in the years
leading up to the crisis.167 In times of stress, governments might also effectively
label and guarantee assets as safe when they use them in monetary policy
operations, or accept them at face value as collateral for central bank lending.
Spelling out the terms of government guarantees for safe assets in full
ahead of time risks moral hazard, and may entail up front budget costs that
would take the option off the table for many governments. It may also be
politically toxic and impractical, in light of the uncertain distinction between
credit and liquidity support. The time inconsistency challenge is daunting. In
lieu of paying for express guarantees, market participants are left to arbitrage
risk-free and low-risk regulatory labels, and pressure governments to validate
their expectations of being made whole using interpretive leeway and
emergency authority.168

In contrast to the economic literature that is our departure point in Part I,
our Article describes safe assets as products of legal intervention to reduce
risks, attract buyers with risk-free labels, and ratify assumptions about safety
with guarantees. Not all forms of intervention operate simultaneously in all safe
assets. All three are clearly visible in private contracts used as if they were riskfree, including bank debt, repos, and asset-backed securities. Only labels are
salient for national government debt denominated in the national currency.169
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167.
See supra notes 78, 92, 106-107 (asset-backed securities), (repos), & 136-139 (money
market mutual funds) and accompanying text; see also Bernanke et al., supra note 45, at 7-8.
168.
Gelpern, supra note 147 at 1055-1056, 1105-1106.
169.
Making safe (policy discipline, financial engineering) and third-party guarantees become
more important with the weakening of government control over the means of payment and its authority
over the market in which the debt is trading. Government debt denominated in a foreign currency or sold
abroad needs more than the debtor’s own risk-free label to trade as if it were risk-free. Put differently,
where a government functions like a private issuer, it needs more outside reinforcement to achieve riskfree treatment for its debt. See supra Part I.C. For example, states are not normally subject to balance
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A legal intervention tool can enhance the safety of an asset in multiple
ways at once. For example, express intervention to “make safe” almost always
comes with incidental labels, which separate regulated firms and safe harbored
contracts from the rest.170 Express guarantees similarly convey labels. Labels
that purport to describe also make assets more liquid.
While our analytical framework is new, it embraces familiar contractual,
regulatory, and economic policy tools, long used and manipulated by
governments and market participants—portfolio construction, covenant
protections, prudential regulation, licensing, certification, and the use of thirdparty information intermediaries—as well as central bank lending and deposit
insurance. All these tools perform their stated function and, at the same time,
construct entire categories of safe assets. Our perspective implies a research
and policy focus on interactions, misalignments, and tradeoffs among different
forms of intervention, which we develop in Part III.
III. What Can Go Wrong? Architecture, Revisited
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sheet or activities regulations. However, when a state gives up control of its currency in a monetary
union, it may submit to external policy discipline and seek guarantees to have its debt treated as a safe
asset. The Euro area treaty framework specifies key aspects of the economic policy mix for member
states; it can resemble institutional regulation—“making safe.” See, e.g., R. Daniel Kelemen & Terence
K. Teo, Law, Focal Points and Fiscal Discipline in the United States and the European Union, 108 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 365-67 (2014). However, the Euro area’s rejection of mutualization (guarantees)
cast doubt on the status of weaker members’ bonds as safe assets. Policy reforms to make them safe
were not enough for the markets. See UBS Center, supra note 1. On cashflow tranching, seniorsubordinate structures, and debt mutualization, see Brunnermeier et al., supra note 49; Jakob von
Weizsäcker & Jacques Delpla, The Blue Bond Proposal, BRUEGEL (May 5, 2010),
http://bruegel.org/2010/05/the-blue-bond-proposal.
170.
National and global designations of systemically important financial firms illustrate
incidental labeling. The stated purpose of systemic designation is stricter regulatory oversight. Critics
claim that a label such as “Systemically Important Bank” (“SIB”) marks a firm as too economically and
politically important to fail, so that its creditors are practically guaranteed a bailout. Press Release,
Financial Stability Board, FSB Announces Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks
(G-SIBs) (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/pr_141106b.pdf.
Whether the costs of such incidental labels, including guarantees and distortions, exceed the benefits of
enhanced oversight in any given case is an empirical question.
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Many of the risks in the legal architecture of safe assets are simply those
associated with any public intervention in finance. This is unsurprising, since
the same tools are involved. Poor design, lax oversight, capture, and bailouts
are not unique to the safe asset universe.
Policymakers make, label, and guarantee the safety of contracts that
become safe assets at different times for many different purposes. Such
interventions are not normally coordinated with the singular intent of creating a
low-risk, highly liquid asset class. It is no surprise, then, that safe assets are
especially prone to mismatches among their risk attributes, their regulatory
treatment, and the functions they perform in the financial markets. Mismatches
can come about in multiple ways and cause serious damage. First, safe assets
breed new risks when market participants adapt them to different uses and
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combine them in structures far removed from the original purpose for which
they had been made safe.171 Second, making, labeling, and guaranteeing can
become dramatically misaligned. The misalignment is amplified by the credit
cycle and exploited by public and private actors, fueling financial instability.
Third, public and private actors use the safety toolkit, especially labeling, to
redistribute resources on a large scale in nontransparent and unaccountable
ways.172 We examine these concerns in turn.
A. Misuse, Composition, and Contagion

407

C M
Y K

11/18/2016 10:27:53

171.
Some legal fictions present similar risks. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 25 (using examples
from tax law to illustrate the risks of combining multiple legal fictions); Seema K. Shah, Piercing the
Veil: The Limits of Brain Death as a Legal Fiction, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 301, 317-18 (2015)
(noting legal fictions facilitate the treatment of different entities as if they were the same); see also
FULLER, supra note 11, at 123 (pointing out the dangers of fictions unmoored from context).
172.
Cf. Smith, supra note 20, at 1473 (noting judges use legal fictions to mask normative
choices).
173.
For banks, see, for example, National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Charles-Henri Weymuller, Banks as Safety Multipliers: A
Theory
of
Safe
Assets
Creation
(Working
Paper
2013),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/chweymuller/files/chweymuller_banksafe_22nov13.pdf. For money
market mutual funds, see Fisch & Roiter, supra note 99, at 4.
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A contract that is made and labeled safe for one purpose may be used for
another. Such versatility is an important shared attribute of safe assets, covered
at length in Part I. Table 1 suggested that versatility may have troubling
implications: if one set of users of one safe asset loses faith in its safety, the
others may follow, setting off contagion across institutional balance sheets and
markets where safe assets are repackaged and reconfigured to meet the needs of
different users.
For a recent example, we return to the tangle of wires linking government
debt, bank debt, money market fund shares, repos, and asset-backed securities
(ABS). Commercial banks and money market mutual funds have long bought
government debt as a condition of licensing and regulatory privilege.173
Government debt holdings allowed bank and mutual fund liabilities to be
labeled safe, and made them suitable as ingredients in a new round of safe
assets. In the mid-2000s, ABS designed to meet regulatory requirements for
permitted investments came to substitute for government debt on institutional
balance sheets. New regulatory and bankruptcy exemptions encouraged market
participants to herd into ABS contracts, including asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Money market funds
bought ABCP, while repos backed by MBS became an important source of
bank funding. Layers of ABS, money market fund shares, and bank debt all
derived from the same kernel of bespoke safety originally designed to meet
regulatory labeling requirements. Until 2007, all this structuring produced
positive spillovers, enhanced market liquidity, and seemed to justify continued
expansion of safety labels. Shocks to the ABS market beginning in 2007
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reverberated across the repo market, to banks and money market mutual funds.
To contain the crisis, government debt and central bank money replaced ABS
and other assets that had lost value.174
Reconsidering the events of 2007-2009 through the lens of safe assets
highlights the danger of mismatches between the risk attributes of financial
contracts, the ways in which they are labeled and used, and the users’ riskbearing capacity—as well as the state’s capacity (financial, political, and
technical) to make up for these mismatches ex ante and ex post.175 If safety
were an inherent attribute of an asset, it would matter little whether that asset
were bought by a commercial bank, a central bank, a mutual fund, a currency
reserve manager, or a currency trading desk. Yet these buyers have different
investment horizons, cash needs, and legal and practical capacity to manage
risks. There is a strong argument that no single asset would be safe for all of
them at all times. Ignoring this argument may leave the financial system as a
whole more exposed to asset price shocks.176
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174.
On bank holdings of ABS, see Acharya et al., supra note 46. In Europe, countries with
outsized banking sectors saw dramatic feedback effects (the “doom loop”): bank rescues shook
confidence in government debt, which in turn hurt newly rescued bank balance sheets, and made it
harder for banks to borrow. See, e.g., Gardner et al., supra note 55, at (describing doom loop effects in
the Irish financial crisis).
175.
Post-crisis regulatory reforms in consumer financial protection and asset securitization
illustrate the challenge of reconciling multiple imperatives to make financial contracts safe for very
different constituencies—including borrowers, lenders, and investors—while restoring access to credit.
Regulations that require lenders to ascertain borrowers’ ability to repay can make loan contracts safer
for consumers. Cf. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J. (Summer 2007),
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate. By reducing the risk of default, the same
regulations can make mortgages safer for bank lenders. 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,688 (Dec. 24, 2014)
(“Consistent with these statistical models, historical data indicate that borrowers with residential
mortgages that meet the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Qualified Mortgage (QM)] criteria
have lower probabilities of default than those with mortgages that do not meet the criteria.”). Like the
fifty percent risk weight for residential mortgage loans (see supra notes 133-137), the QM label marks a
consumer mortgage as relatively safe, though not risk-free, for banks. Rules that exempt securitization
vehicles from equity-like risk-retention requirements, see supra note 107, because the underlying
mortgages meet QM criteria (including loan-level disclosure) can signal that consumer safety translates
directly into safety for capital markets investors. As U.S. regulators have observed, this is not always the
case. Using the QM label to support securitization entails “a tradeoff between, on the one hand,
promoting financial market recovery and borrower access to capital, and, on the other hand, adding
additional credit requirements that may lessen the likelihood of future moral hazards related to the
lending practices in the housing market but also further constrain mortgage credit.” 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602,
77,739 (Dec. 24, 2014). In light of the risks, regulators commit to revisit the relationship as consumer
protection rules and securitization markets evolve. Id. A reassessment would be important if private
label RMBS were used as safe assets again, as they had been before 2007.
176.
Avinash Persaud, How Not to Regulate Insurance Markets, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON.
(Apr. 2015), http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb15-5.pdf; WARWICK COMM’N ON INT’L FIN.
REFORM,
IN
PRAISE
OF
UNLEVEL
PLAYING
FIELDS
4,
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/financialreform/report/executive_summary.p
df (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) [hereinafter WARWICK COMM’N] (criticizing “the erroneous view that
there is a single thing called risk, and that it is inherent in the characteristics of an asset or financial
instrument. . . . The notion that there are ‘safe’ instruments to be promoted and ‘risky’ ones to be banned
creates a false sense of security. You can do a lot of risky things with apparently safe instruments, like a
mortgage.”).
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Inside Safe Assets
In sum, the same features that make safe assets useful—their versatility
and their capacity to serve as ingredients in financial transactions, including
other safe assets—can fuel risks. When a contract designed to minimize
particular risks for particular users comes to be used as if it were safe in
general, it can collapse abruptly and fuel contagion. In terms of our three-part
framework, the contract is not made safe enough for the ways in which it is
used.
B. Misalignment

409

C M
Y K

11/18/2016 10:27:53

177.
See, e.g., ESRB, SOVEREIGN REPORT, supra note 12; Ben Moshinsky, Holding Sovereign
Debt with No Capital Is Risky, IASB Chief Says, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 03, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-03/holding-sovereign-debt-with-no-capital-is-risky
-iasb-chief-says; Robert Pozen & Theresa Hamacher, Not All Money Market Funds Are Equal, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012), www.ft.com/cms/s/0/29e2d6d0-4393-11e2-a68c-00144feabdc0.html (stating
that “[r]egulators have argued that a fixed NAV creates systemic risk in the financial system and
misleads investors into thinking their investment is guaranteed.”).
178.
See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 114.
179.
See Gerding, supra note 18 (arguing against the regulated-unregulated dichotomy, which
dominates scholarly and policy treatments of shadow banking).
180.
This extends the insight in Gourinchas and Jeanne, supra note 42, that the state is
responsible for credibly committing to define and make good on the safe asset frontier. When the
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The spectacular failures of “zero-risk” and “AAA” financial contracts in
2007, 2008, and 2010 are often described in retrospect as crises of
mislabeling,177 followed by misguided bailouts.178 It is more accurate to
describe them as crises of misalignment. This is because neither the label nor
the guarantee is inherently problematic; the threat to financial stability comes
from a build-up of risk in contracts labeled safe—so safe that they become
systemically important—but not made safe enough. If such contracts fail to pay
off according to the label, they are likely to trigger ex post guarantees.
Our view of financial instability stemming from misalignment among
safety attributes and uses, and, related, among different modes of
intervention—making, labeling, and guarantees—stands in contrast to other
analytical frames for financial stability regulation, most notably shadow
banking. The shadow banking paradigm broadly stipulates a regulated “inside”
and an unregulated but functionally similar “outside,” separated by the
regulatory perimeter. It implies a regulatory task of identifying unregulated but
regulation-worthy institutions and activities, and bringing them inside the
perimeter. The paradigm entrenches discontinuity between markets, actors, and
transactions on opposite sides of the perimeter.179
In contrast, based on our study of safe assets, we see a much more
continuous landscape of legal and regulatory interventions to manage risk.
Many of these interventions, including those very much inside the perimeter,
fall short. All along, the state has a contingent liability for safe assets, filling
gaps between “made safer” and “labeled safe.”180 Market perceptions of such
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guarantee does not live up to the label (as in the example of Icelandic bank debt, supra note 148), the
gap must be made up by making the asset safer.
181.
See, e.g., Omarova, Quiet supra note 124 (tracing regulatory expansion of permitted
derivatives activities for banks); cf. Saule T. Omarova, That Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the
History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV. OF BANKING AND FIN. L.
113, 126-27 (2011) (loosening constraints on banking conglomerate regulation).
182.
For example, investors may have read “Greek debt is zero-risk” as “Germany stands
behind Greece,” rather than “Greece is creditworthy”—notwithstanding European treaty provisions
barring debt mutualization. See David Oakley, Sovereign Debt on Red Alert, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 11,
2009), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3760aa96-e683-11de-98b1-00144feab49a.html#axzz3jANp5600.
Cf. Gourinchas and Jeanne on government credibility in defining the universe of safe assets, supra note
42.
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gaps vary over the course of the credit cycle. Risk-free labels look like accurate
descriptions when credit is ample, while regulation looks pointless and costly.
To extend (let alone price) guarantees seems unnecessary and politically
unthinkable in good times. The risk of misalignment is highest when no one is
minding the gaps.
Some gaps are hard to avoid because labels tend to be discontinuous.
Permitted or forbidden investment, fixed or floating NAV, zero or 50% risk
weight are sharp distinctions, useful precisely because they help coordinate
market participants in a world of infinite risk gradations. Bright lines help herd
market participants into a limited set of investments, which regulators may find
easier to monitor. However, discontinuity necessarily implies a measure of
misalignment. As we noted in Part II, tools to make contracts safe often operate
incrementally. They work as dials, while labels work as switches. When
investors observe a big enough gap between actual and advertised risk, they
may rush to sell, or press the state to pay out on implicit guarantees.
Misalignment also follows necessarily from the stickiness of safety labels.
Once the state or a large number of market participants attach the term “safe” to
an asset, it is hard to remove—as we observed in Part I.A, labels that change
often are useless in safe assets. If the label is successful, the asset comes to be
used widely; more people have a stake in its safety. Taking the label away
would bring on a general, abrupt repricing of risk, as savers rearrange their
portfolios, traders demand new collateral, and complex structures unravel
because the assets at their core no longer qualify as safe. Fear of such market
disruption can turn into a justification for keeping labels in place or expanding
them, a one-way ratchet that leads to more misalignment.181
Risk reduction (making safe) and guarantees are complements. If private
ordering and regulation cannot ensure full and timely payoff, guarantees may
have to fill the gap to limit destruction from a financial crisis. On the other
hand, labels such as “zero risk” convey highly ambiguous messages. Investors
can interpret them either as descriptions or as warranties by the labeling
authorities to maintain the safety of labeled assets.182 For example, the zero-risk
label for all Euro area government debt was apparently understood by some
market participants as a collective promise by euro area authorities to avoid
default at all costs—despite the fact that no government on its own could
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decide to print the euros to pay its debt. The label also worked as a commitment
device, since it encouraged financial integration, including German and French
financial institutions buying Greek government debt.183 When European leaders
suggested that debt restructuring was a possibility, markets panicked even
though member states simultaneously promised to make their debt safer with
fiscal reforms.184 If the safe asset status of Greek, Irish, Italian, and Spanish
debt hinged on Europe’s political commitment to it, then Europe’s dilution of
this commitment ended the status; fiscal reforms were not enough to make up
the difference.185
C. Distribution: The Politics of Safe Assets
Public intervention in safe assets distributes resources and power. Market
participants compete to benefit from intervention to attract capital, to lower
costs, and to gain access to subsidies. Labeling contracts and institutions safe is
a simple way to route capital in their direction. Government guarantees,
particularly those that are not priced in advance, transfer public resources to
some combination of safe asset users and issuers. Making contracts and
institutions safe can function as a regulatory tax, forcing users and issuers to
internalize risks associated with their activities instead of fobbing them off on
the public. On the other hand, it can also redistribute costs among market
actors—as in the case of priorities and bankruptcy safe harbors. The scale of
distribution is immense. Multi-trillion dollar markets depend on the risk-free
treatment of certain assets for vital funding. However, the language of safety
obscures the stakes and normative commitments in safe assets. If the public
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183.
See Paul Blustein, Laid Low: The IMF, the Euro Zone, and the First Rescue of Greece 11
(CIGI
Papers
No.
61-April
2015),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no.61web.pdf (discussing French and German
bank holdings of Greek debt). Because of its ability to direct investment, the label might have been a
more effective commitment device than the prohibition on bailouts in the European treaties, which was
not similarly embedded in markets and institutions.
184.
See Franco-German Declaration, Statement for the French-German-Russian Summit
Deauville (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.feelingeurope.eu/Pages/Franco
-german_declaration%20Deauville%2018-10-2010.pdf; Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member, Executive
Board of the ECB, Speech at the Reinventing Bretton Woods Conference (June 6, 2011),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110606.en.html; Anna Gelpern & G. Mitu
Gulati, The Wonder-Clause, 41 J. OF COMP. ECON. 367, 380 (2013); Peter Spiegel, Eurocats Scratch
Heads Over ‘Haircuts’, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fbfaed14-da31-11e0
-90b2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ZQdxloy8; Athanasios Orphanides, The Euro Area Crisis: Politics over
Economics
(MIT
Sloan
School
Working
Paper
5091-14,
2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2448197.
185.
For ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet, the crisis ended a unique “privilege,” where “the
signature of the advanced economies . . . was untouchable—in that sense, there is no more risk-free
asset. The investors and savers the world over are looking at every signature on the basis of its
fundamentals.” The implication seems to be that euro area policy makers had a duty to make the debt
risk-free despite any “fundamentals.” UBS Center, supra note 1. By extension, lower risk weights for
non-government debt convey a smaller implicit guarantee, another political commitment. Whether such
commitments are credible is a separate question, which goes to the guarantor’s economic and
institutional capacity.
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believes safe assets to be “default-free” as a matter of fact rather than policy,
public intervention involves no judgment, and may not call for political
accountability.
Governments constructing safe assets might be responding to diplomatic
imperatives, industrial policy, interest group pressure, or a simple need to raise
money for the state treasury. Some measures to make contracts safer, such as
bank capital regulation, distribute between market participants and the public,
forcing private market actors to internalize the costs of their risk-taking. Others
distribute among private stakeholders. For example, bankruptcy safe harbors
for repos instantly made them more attractive than functionally similar
contracts, such as short-term secured loans, and helped fuel dramatic growth in
the repo market.186 Safe harbors also changed the norms of bankruptcy
distribution, effectively shifting assets out of the bankruptcy estate for the
benefit of the debtor’s repo counterparties.187
Safety labels help public officials channel popular savings for policy
priorities.188 Low risk weights for housing and small business debt in bank
capital adequacy regulation provide a simple illustration.189 When the
regulatory cost of a home mortgage or housing agency debt is a fraction of the
regulatory cost of corporate debt, more popular savings should flow to fund
housing. Governments can be quite transparent about the political character of
labels. For example, when the Basel capital accords were first negotiated in
1988, Europe insisted on uniform treatment for the debt of all its member
states. Partly as a result, the accords assigned zero-risk weight to all
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186.
When the U.S. Congress enacted bankruptcy exemptions for repos in 1984, it responded
to market participants’ widespread use of this instrument as if the market had lowered counterparty risk.
After Congress exempted repos from key provisions of the bankruptcy code, repo markets enjoyed
significant growth. Acharya & Öncü, supra note 17, at 308; see also Adrian et al., supra note 79, at 1213; Morrison et al., supra note 15, at 10. The experience with repos highlights potential complexities of
distribution in safe assets. On the one hand, bankruptcy safe harbors reduce both credit and liquidity
risks associated with repo contracts. On the other hand, protecting repos when the debtor is insolvent
comes at the expense of other creditors of the bankruptcy estate and the debtor’s rehabilitation prospects,
in tension with bankruptcy policy. It can also come at the expense of the public: making repos more
liquid led to runs when the financial system came under stress in 2008 and created a contingent liability
for the public. Morrison et al., supra note 15, at 1026.
187.
Id.
188.
See RONALD I. MACKINNON, MONEY AND CAPITAL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 69-73
(1973); EDWARD SHAW, FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1973) (defining
“financial repression” as state-driven capital allocation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America). These works
launched a decades-long debate about financial repression, focusing primarily on developing countries.
A recent revival led by Reinhart and co-authors recasts this debate in the context of heavily indebted
high income economies. See, e.g., Carmen M. Reinhart & M. Belen Sbrancia, The Liquidation of
Government Debt (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16893, 2011),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16893 (describing how governments can induce domestic financial firms
to buy their debt—a domestic safe asset—and inflate it away). Political economy factors account for the
sprawling list of investments that national banks are allowed to make, channeling capital into particular
sectors and activities. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2012).
189.
For an example of how capital weights give preference to small businesses and housing,
see Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision Handbook, Section 120
Appendix B – Risk-Weighted Assets (Sept. 2010), available at https://www.occ.gov/static/news
-issuances/ots/exam-handbook/ots-exam-handbook-120ab.pdf.
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190.
“[M]ost importantly, the member states of the European Community are firmly
committed to the principle that all claims on banks, central governments and the official sector within
European Community countries should be treated in the same way.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING REGS.
& SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards
34 (Apr. 1998), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf (allowing banks to assign a zero percent risk
weight to exposures to OECD member countries). For a list of OECD member countries, see List of
OECD Member Countries OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member
-countries.htm (last visited Feb, 21, 2016); see also Talley, supra note 124 (describing the Volcker
Rule’s trading exemption for foreign government debt following other countries’ lobbying efforts).
191.
See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
192.
See Dan Awrey, Toward a Supply-Side Theory of Financial Innovation, 41 J. OF COMP.
ECON. 401 (2013); David A. Skeel, Jr. & Frank Partnoy, The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007).
193.
Cf. supra note 175.
194.
Omarova, Quiet, supra note 124.
195.
See, e.g., Bernanke et al., supra note 45, at 13-15.
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government and central bank debt issued by members of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a diverse group that
includes Iceland, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and the United States.190 To
attach the same regulatory price tag to the debts of such different countries
invites arbitrage and introduces distortions.
We noted earlier that safe assets develop constituencies with abiding
interest in their continued safety. In the United States, industry lobbying has
resulted in favorable treatment for repos, derivatives, and other safe-harbored
contracts. National and local government officials won privileges for their
bonds in proprietary trading and bank liquidity regulations.191 Issuers benefit
when governments create a market in their securities with labels, and sustain it
with safe harbors.192 Buyers similarly benefit from secondary market liquidity,
which brings the asset closer to cash. Enhanced liquidity also has upstream
benefits: more liquid asset-backed securities can expand access to credit and
lower the cost of borrowing for firms and consumers.193
In all these cases, distribution is not the primary problem. The problem is
with the safety rhetoric, which wraps distribution choices in technocratic
packaging, so that they are unacknowledged and shielded from substantive
political debate. The quest for completely, genuinely safe assets is an extreme
example of the problem, which can persist even when the standard is “safe
enough.” For instance, a series of incremental regulatory interpretations turned
highly leveraged derivatives contracts into permitted investments for banks, on
par with plain vanilla corporate loans—and masked a build-up of systemic
risk.194 Separately, it was political subterfuge.
Governments and private actors perpetuate misalignments to secure their
preferred distributional outcomes. Market participants arbitrage the gap
between regulatory labels and the underlying risk attributes of an asset to boost
their returns; they count on government guarantees if the gamble fails.195 Public
authorities use safety labels to allocate capital while avoiding politically
unpopular regulation and express guarantees, which visibly add to the public
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debt stock. Deferring awkward questions about subsidies, distribution, and
distortions until crisis time offers all potential beneficiaries the hope that they
would be lost in the emergency noise.196 The political constituency for aligning
making, labeling, and guarantees up front is small to begin with; it becomes
vanishingly small when safety rhetoric obscures the possibility of
misalignment.
IV. Preliminary Prescriptions
Intervention in safe assets should reduce financial instability, align public
and private actors’ incentives, and inform an open policy debate about
embedded trade-offs and distribution. Our framework for analyzing safe assets
highlights cyclical misalignment among making, labeling, and guaranteeing as
a critical challenge for financial stability policy, with important political
consequences. The same framework points to preliminary prescriptions and
familiar tools with which to pursue them.
In this Part, we develop a general approach to mitigate misalignment. We
argue that potential safe assets should be monitored throughout the credit cycle.
Tools that make, label, and guarantee them should be realigned dynamically,
consistent with that policy goal. To promote alignment, the use of public safety
labels should be minimized; where it persists—perhaps because they are too
deeply embedded in existing prudential regulation—the labeling authorities
should treat labels presumptively as express guarantees that give rise to
contingent liability for the public.
A. Dynamic Alignment
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196.
On the other hand, keeping guarantees uncertain ex ante can dissuade risk-taking. It is
especially appealing when charging for guarantees is politically unacceptable. The academic debates
about the tradeoffs between implicit and explicit, ex ante and ex post guarantees is beyond the scope of
this Article. Here, we simply note its relevance to safe assets. See also Shefali Anand & Jennifer Levitz,
Auction-Rate Bailouts Bypass Some Investors, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122048821448297341 (allowing no government bailout of auction rate
securities and the eventual, limited bank buyback of the securities); Gretchen Morgenson, If You Can’t
Sell, Good Luck, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2008), http://nytimes.com/2008/03/30/business/30gret.html.
197.
Reforms in the U.S. repo market have led to the gathering and publication of more
detailed data on securities used as collateral for tri-party repos. Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform,
FED. RES. BANK OF NEW YORK, http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform.html (last visited
Feb, 21, 2016). Rationalizing public intervention in safe assets requires more detailed and dynamic data
gathering for a broader range of transactions built on assets assumed to be risk-free. Cf. Adrian et al.,
supra note 79, at 12-16 (advocating more granular data gathering on contract terms, collateral, and
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A policy response to misalignment must begin by identifying contracts
used as if they were risk-free for monitoring throughout the cycle. Financial
flow data does not yield a comprehensive picture; isolating contract uses and
assumptions behind them—getting “inside safe assets”—requires a nuanced
understanding of transaction patterns, institutional design, and regulatory
incentives, where legal knowledge is indispensable.197 Beyond cataloguing
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counterparties in the repo market). On legal knowledge in financial markets and regulation, see
generally, RILES, supra note 11.
198.
Andrea Aguiar, Richard Bookstaber, Dror Y. Kenett and Thomas Wipf, Map of
Collateral Uses and Flows, (Office of Financial Research Working Paper 16-06, 2016),
https://financialresearch.gov/working-papers/files/OFRwp-2016-06_Map-of-Collateral-Uses.pdf.
Repeated assessments using a consistent framework such as this should develop a higher level of
granularity. Cf. Adrian et al. supra note 79, at 16-17.
199.
Stress tests for firms and markets focusing on deterioration of certain key assets should
help identify the extent of public exposure. The review may also conclude that the liability cannot be
reduced or if reducing it is undesirable. This too is a valuable exercise. See Adrian Blundell-Wignall &
Patrick Slovik, The EU Stress Test and Sovereign Debt Exposures 9-11 (OECD Working Papers on Fin.,
Ins. and Private Pensions, No. 4, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/45820698.pdf.
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potential safe assets, it is important to establish who is using them and for what
purpose, especially when a single contract serves multiple purposes. A
collateral mapping exercise of the sort undertaken in May of 2016 by research
staff at the U.S. Office of Financial Research should, when repeated over time,
reveal usage patterns and links among assets and institutions, as well as risks of
misuse and contagion.198
The initial assessment should reveal any public interventions that might
support the risk-free treatment of identified contracts, and classify them as
making, labeling, or guaranteeing. Doing so may expose mixed messages (such
as incidental labeling) and misalignment at the outset, and over time. A
diagnosis of misalignment implies a risk of abrupt repricing, and a contingent
liability for the state. It would normally call for additional intervention to
contain assumptions about safety (limit labels), make contracts safer (equity
and collateral requirements and activities restrictions), and charge premia for
guarantees.199 However, charging for guarantees up front must be weighed
against the cost of making them explicit and the associated moral hazard.
Monitoring safe assets from the baseline established in the initial
assessment should also reveal sharp changes in supply or demand, as well as
the emergence of novel transaction patterns and asset uses. Monitoring should
presumptively focus on assets that enjoy regulatory privileges, including but
not limited to express labels. Changes in the volume or use of such assets could
serve as early warning signals of misalignment, regulatory arbitrage, and
growing systemic significance of particular asset markets.
Even absent dramatic changes, we would support a version of periodic
stress tests focused on asset markets, as distinct from systemically important
institutions. For example, if monitoring revealed that a financial contract
performed two or more safe asset functions of the sort we illustrate in Table 1,
and reached a pre-specified volume threshold in one or more markets, national
financial stability regulators might be required to model the consequences of a
five, ten, and fifteen per cent drop in the value of such contracts. In contrast to
the existing institutional stress tests, the modeling exercise would not be used
in the first instance as a supervisory tool, nor would it attempt to simulate
realistic stress scenarios. To the contrary, the exercise would be premised on
widespread consensus that the asset in question is extremely unlikely to suffer
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any loss in value, and is risk-free for all practical purposes. The primary
objective would be to identify the consequences of the consensus being wrong.
Such asset stress tests could help identify multiple financial institutions and
other financial markets that might be affected by the loss of a safe asset; they
would also indicate potential for, and perhaps even the extent of, contingent
liabilities for the state. Armed with an initial diagnosis of likely transmission
channels and damage potential, regulators could factor the findings into
supervisory stress tests, and use them as a basis for interventions such as
margin requirements and concentration limits. Institutions such as the Financial
Stability Board and the IMF, charged with safeguarding global financial
stability, could play an important role both in developing consistent
methodologies, and helping spread best practices in this area. 200
A spike in the use of certain contracts as if they were risk-free, rapid
growth in substitution and complex combinations, or a diagnosis of institutional
or market vulnerability in periodic stress tests, should prompt a review and
realignment of the underlying intervention tools. Raising capital charges for
surging assets, imposing quantitative restrictions, extending and charging for
guarantees are among the options. Such measures need not apply to all uses and
users across the board. In some cases, it may be enough to keep particularly
vulnerable regulated firms away from the riskiest forms of safe asset
substitution and combination (or the most complex derivative forms of safe
assets).
Intervention to correct misalignment would, of course, face the same
political challenges as any other countercyclical measures. When the world
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200.
Stress testing asset markets would be more complex than the stress tests now conducted
on individual financial institutions because it would entail modeling the behavior and interactions of
many investors. However, policymakers and scholars are already considering tools that might be
adapted for this purpose as they analyze the experience with institutional stress tests so far. See e.g.,
Kieran Dent, Ben Westwood & Miguel Segoviano, Stress Testing of Banks: An Introduction, BANK OF
ENGLAND
QUARTERLY
BULLETIN
2016
Q3
130
(Sep.
5,
2016),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2016/q3/q3.pdf
(highlighting the narrow institutional focus of the prevailing supervisory stress tests, and arguing for the
need to expand their scope beyond banks, and to incorporate amplification and feedback mechanisms in
future stress tests); MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, BANKING’S FINAL EXAM: LESSONS FROM U.S. AND E.U.-WIDE
BANK STRESS TESTS, Chapter 3 (forthcoming 2017, manuscript on file with authors) (reviewing
academic and policy critiques of bank stress tests as inadequate to identify potential contagion
dynamics). Asset stress tests of the sort we propose would not be confined to a limited set of
institutions—they would reach firms, special purpose vehicles, and contractual arrangements that might
not be considered systemic, or that would be in the realm of “shadow banking”—however, authorities
would still need to delimit the universe of assets to be tested. At the outset, it may make sense to focus
on private safe assets, which are more vulnerable to shocks. See supra note 54 and accompanying text
(discussing the properties of public and private safe assets). Beyond matters of scope, open questions
include modeling methodology, disclosure of test results, regulatory and supervisory consequences, if
any, of asset stress tests. We leave these for another article. For examples of law scholarship on bank
stress testing, see e.g., Robert F. Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation,
98 MINN. L. REV. 2236 (2014), Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247
(2014) (discussing “war games” as a means to improve prudential regulation of financial institutions);
John Crawford, Wargaming Financial Crises: the Problem of (In)experience and Regulator Expertise,
34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 111 (2014-15) (proposing war games as a means to improve policymaker
preparedness for financial crises).
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201.
Compare WARWICK COMM’N, supra note 176, at 4-5; Persaud, supra note 176, at 4-5;
and Fisher, supra note 31, at 65-66; with Nouy, supra note 11. A boom in any given asset may make it
both more fragile and more entrenched—either gradually, or past a tipping point of systemic importance.
202.
Separately, the implicit safe asset functions of public intervention tools should be
monitored for compatibility with their stated policy functions. For example, bankruptcy safe harbors
support debtor rehabilitation and minimize risks associated with certain financial contracts. When
tensions surface between bankruptcy and safe asset functions, both may be compromised. The tool may
need to be adjusted, supplemented, or replaced. Morrison et al., supra note 15.
203.
Supra note 174 and the accompanying text.
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looks risk-free, the constituency for public risk-management is vanishingly
small. Our approach does not solve the fundamental political problem. Instead,
it identifies a menu of established legal tools to manage it and makes the
tradeoffs among them more transparent.
At the most basic level, our project implies a shift in regulatory rhetoric.
We argue against evaluating contracts as safe or risky. Instead, we favor an
oversight regime that focuses on matching the risk attributes of a contract to the
way in which it is being used.201 Gaps between asset uses and attributes can
harbor systemic risk. Here too, alignment, not safety, is the goal.202
A safe asset crisis exposes the failure of prior intervention. Old goals and
tools give way to new ones. The immediate objective in crisis is to contain
damage from an abrupt loss of safety. “Making safe” works incrementally ex
ante; prudential regulations are ill-equipped to stop a generalized panic.
Regulatory forbearance, or directing firms to act as if the assets were still safe
(a form of labeling) can buy time for market participants to rebuild their
balance sheets and absorb losses without resorting to public support. However,
forbearance can also delay resolution, prolong the crisis, and raise its total costs
for the economy and for the government. As the crisis wears on, the state may
have little choice but to pay out on express and implied guarantees. Public debt
and money would, appropriately, replace private safe assets.203
Payouts on guarantees lift the veil on the distribution consequences of safe
asset policies and set the stage for distribution battles in resolution and
recovery. Fears of moral hazard loom large. Paradoxically, belated revelations
about guarantees and public debates about risk can backfire. Public authorities
facing a crisis of credibility are tempted to promise safety in general and
forswear bailouts. Neither promise is fully credible. Both contribute to
misalignment. For instance, it is hard to renounce guarantees and charge for
them up front at the same time.
There are few alternatives to “making safe” after a crisis. Nevertheless,
some of the safe asset literature surveyed in Part I gives voice to a counterargument: making individual contracts safer would reduce the stock of safe
assets, depress financial activity and slow economic recovery. Empirical
evidence so far does not support this view, particularly when tighter regulation
of particular contracts and institutions takes place against the background of
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accommodative monetary policy.204 A related concern that regulating the
production of some safe assets more stringently after a crisis would cause
market participants to shift to riskier ones, and push out the safety frontier also
needs more support to justify a major policy shift.
B. Fixing Labels
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204.
See, e.g., Valentina Bruno, Ilhyock Shim, & Hyun Song Shin, Comparative Assessment
of Macroprudential Policies 15-16 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 502, 2015),
http://www.bis.org/publ/work502.pdf.
205.
From this perspective, zero-risk weight for local-currency government debt is more
intuitive than $1 NAV for money market mutual fund shares, which in turn makes more sense than a
50% risk weight for mortgage loans.
206.
Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, Speech at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 366th Economic Policy Symposium: The Dog and the Frisbee (Aug. 31,
2012), http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf.
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Labels are the most troublesome category of tools supporting safe assets.
They can be innocuous enough when aligned with the risk attributes of a
contract, or with appropriately priced guarantees. However, in practice, they
encourage governments and market participants to take hidden risks and to shift
the consequences onto others. As we noted in Part III, regulators’
understandable affinity for simple, discontinuous labels to promote
coordination also promotes misalignment. Public labels come with the
additional cost of muting price signals and preempting market-based
information discovery. Since they not only describe low risk, but also enable
and encourage market participants to buy, sell, repackage and adapt labeled
assets for different uses, public labels can introduce distortions and
discontinuities on the ground, and with them, the potential for instability.
Public labels can be justified if market mechanisms fail, but not if the state
does no better. The state may have an information advantage with respect to
some assets, such as its own debt denominated in a currency it can print. For
claims denominated in foreign currencies, claims on other governments, and
claims on regulated institutions, the information advantage is progressively
attenuated.205 On the other hand, real or suspected conflicts of interest can
easily offset the information advantage. The state might be expected to use
regulatory labels to direct funds into its own coffers or to politically favored
firms and projects—effectively offsetting any information value its labels
might have had.
Labels do have an important advantage in the political economy of
regulation. Their bluntness makes them more intelligible and therefore more
politically accountable.206 Label-as-license, applied to assets, stands out in this
respect. “Permitted” and “forbidden” investments, activities, and affiliations do
not purport to represent safety attributes, even if they might imply a degree of
safety (safe enough). Market prices might continue to convey valuable
information about such assets.
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207.
See supra Part III.A, B.
208.
For purposes of this Article, we do not take a stand on further budget accounting issues,
such as how guarantees expressed as labels should be treated compared to more overt guarantees. See
INT’L MONETARY FUND, Fiscal
Transparency,
Accountability,
and
Risk
(2012),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/080712.pdf.
209.
See, e.g., supra note 188.
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On the other hand, label-as-price has minimal information value of its
own, even as it tries to block market price signals. It is also rife with mixed
messages, conflicts, and distortions. Risk-free labels in particular are liable to
be interpreted as veiled warranties—commitments by the state to make good on
their content, either by making the asset safe or, more likely, by guaranteeing it.
For these reasons, we argue for minimizing the use of label-as-price to
support safe assets. However, we doubt they would disappear any time soon:
labels are sticky, and have powerful constituents that depend on them for vital
funding.207
As long as such labels persist, they should be treated as express
guarantees of their content—such as “zero risk”—by the labeling
government.208 Accounting for labels as if they were express guarantees would
create incentives against using them willy-nilly, as cheap stand-ins for making
assets safe. It could also force implicit guarantees of the safety label out into
the open and might lead the state to charge for them. The change we propose
would be counter-cyclical, since it would work against the tendency to describe
an asset as absolutely safe in good times, only to see it collapse in a downturn.
Paradoxically, our approach would leave the already-controversial zerorisk designation for the labeling governments’ own debt largely intact for now.
Private and foreign public debt labeled as risk-free would be treated the same
way as the government’s own debt. Our reasons for collapsing the distinction
are analytical and pragmatic. There should be a high bar for labeling any
contract as risk-free. This is especially true of contracts that do not already
carry government backing, because the label can easily create expectations of
guarantees. This is where the contingent liability to the public is highest, as is
the value of information. On the other hand, the scope of liability and the
content of zero-risk labels for governments’ own debt are much more readily
apparent. They reflect a government’s assessment of its own ability and
willingness to pay (where it has an information advantage). The assessment is
open to challenge—and could be subject to stress testing, as we suggested in
the preceding section. Nonetheless, risk-free labels for government debt are
already debated as political commitment and financial repression, not an arm’s
length description.209 As a practical matter, forcing governments to reveal or
withdraw guarantees implicit in their labels of private contracts, and the debts
of other sovereigns, is a bigger priority. All that said, risk-free labels for owngovernment debt add little value. As with the other labels, there are few reasons
to keep them.
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Conclusions
“A fiction becomes wholly safe only when it is used with a complete
consciousness of its falsity.”210 Fuller’s note of caution for legal fictions in
1930 aptly frames our legal intervention in the safe asset debate circa 2016.
Safe assets are never “wholly safe,” but they might be safe enough if those who
make them and use them know the nature and purpose of the enterprise and are
vigilant about managing the inherent risks.
In this Article, we present a framework for understanding how the law
constructs safe assets. It stands in contrast to the economic literature, which
describes them as products of natural supply and demand, meeting the organic
transactional needs in financial markets. Our account reinjects agency into safe
assets: they do not arise spontaneously. Governments and market participants
produce them together, in an iterative political process.
Our framework also suggests how the legal architecture of safe assets
might set the stage for safe asset crises. When assets are labeled safe and used
as if they were safe, but are not made safe enough, they could fail and cause
severe damage, invoking ex post government guarantees. The public must fill
the gap between safe asset facts and safe asset fictions. If guarantees turn out to
be inadequate, damage could grow and metastasize. Such misalignments are
products of policy choices, political pressure, and regulatory arbitrage.
Governments and market participants stand to gain from stretching and
adapting safety fictions for their purposes. One finance official explained the
psychological, intellectual and political appeal of safe asset fictions in this way:
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210.
FULLER, supra note 11 at 10.
211.
Storchak, supra note 31. Portfolio and asset pricing models that key off hypothetical riskfree contracts or rates are further institutionalized, or literally programmed into market participants’
trading strategies, information reporting, firm policies, and government regulations. Market participants
seeking real-life stand-ins for theory’s risk-free assets then construct the world in theory’s image. See,
e.g., MACKENZIE, supra note 32, and Donald MacKenzie & Yuval Mello, Constructing a Market,
Performing Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives Exchange, 109 AM. J. OF
SOCIOLOGY 107 (July 2003) (arguing that options prices on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange
evolved to reflect the Black-Scholes options pricing model, institutionally embedded in the structure of
the exchange—contrary to the prevailing view that the Black-Scholes model discerned pre-existing
market price patterns).
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Let me start with a simple question. Does anyone among us really believe that risk-free assets
exist? Deep in our hearts, we all know that such assets never existed and will never exist in the
market economy. Otherwise, we would live in a different world, in the world where private
initiative and individual decisions are punished, not rewarded as it happens when risks are
taken. Nonetheless, for years market participants have been doing their business on the
assumption that there are risk-free assets. I believe that this concept is a natural human
reaction to the complexity of the world surrounding us. The risk-free theory was welcomed
because it made decision making much easier. And we are always looking for simple
decisions! Plus, the risk-free methodology turned out to become the cornerstone in different
mathematic models for the calculation of the value of any financial asset. From the very
beginning a number of sovereign bonds were treated as risk-free financial instruments. Credit
rating agencies helped a lot in this understanding with their “AAA” versus “BBB” or “CCC”
references.211
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See, e.g., ESRB, SOVEREIGN REPORT, supra note 12.
Portes, supra note 23; Gorton et al., supra note 5, at 105.
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213.
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In response to the risks of misuse, misalignment, crisis, and contagion, we
argue for a safe asset monitoring regime, including stress tests focused on asset
markets rather than institutions, and for dynamically aligning and re-aligning
the three intervention tools—making, labeling, and guarantees—over the
course of the credit cycle. We also advocate eliminating labels that purport to
convey specific information about asset risk, but are likely to be received as
implicit warranties by the labeling government, discouraging market-based risk
assessment. Our interim recommendation is to treat labels such as “zero-risk”
as express guarantees and contingent liabilities of the labeling government.
Paradoxically, this leaves us relatively cool to the controversy over risk-free
labels for government debt,212 since treating such labels as guarantees would
merely reiterate the existing government obligation. We are more concerned
about the implicit extension of government backing to private debts used as if
they were risk-free. The latter features in the dominant accounts of the shadow
banking problem, which, in our framing, may encompass so much of the
financial system that it loses its analytical utility—including, for example,
under-regulated and poorly regulated, implicitly guaranteed assets and
institutions. To label government debt as risk-free may mix tautology and
financial repression, but it has the virtue of transparency.
More broadly, a legal analysis of safe assets suggests that macroprudential
machinery for constructing them comprises very familiar tools for regulating
banks and securities markets. In other words, macroprudential regulation need
not await the development of new space-age tools. The old toolkit can be
deployed to manage the risks in safe assets for the sake of financial stability.
However, the downside is familiar as well. Policymakers will face political
backlash when they try to act counter-cyclically. Our framework makes the
politics and the tradeoffs more readily apparent.
Detailed policy design requires further research. We need to know more
about the effects of different kinds of labels on the behavior of market
participants, about interaction and feedback effects among different tools, and
the relationship between the safe asset toolkit and monetary and fiscal policies.
Monitoring and stress testing safe assets safe assets should help regulators chart
more robust contagion scenarios, give them a better sense of contingent liability
for the public, and adjust their interventions accordingly.
For better or worse, the safe asset meme would not be squelched.213
Financial market participants will continue to treat multi-trillion-dollar markets
as if they were risk-free—until some don’t, to disastrous effect—and the cycle
starts again. To recognize and map legal intervention in safe assets is an
essential first step to make them less destructive, and their makers more
accountable.

